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Abstract
This thesis is a study about the geopolitics of Russia. The main aim of this work is to discuss
the energy geopolitics of Russia within the general geopolitical strategy of the Russian Federation.
Important parts of the thesis focus on the relationships between the Russian geopolitical idea and
practices, and the geopolitics of other world powers, namely the US, the EU and China.
In this thesis, I will separately discuss geopolitical concepts and actions of Russia, the US, the
EU  and  China.  Within  a  general  discussion  of  the  geopolitical  strategies  of  each  country  I
emphasize energy geopolitics and securitisation issues. Also, the situation related to smaller states
that border Russia is analyzed by my thesis. In this case,  I do not evaluate geopolitics of each
smaller state, but rather view them as a part of a geopolitical game of much bigger and stronger
states and their geopolitical aspirations.
The main conclusions of this thesis are related to Russia and its relations to other states and
world powers. Therefore, Russian own geopolitical ambitions could be seen as an attempt to return
to the empire, namely the geopolitical aspirations related to the USSR. Russia puts an effort to
develop its  army with militarization linked with and to the survival of the Russian nation in a
competition with other world powers. The other policy area where the Russian ambitions becomes
clear are projects related to integration of the smaller states within a post-soviet dominated Russian
sphere of influence via military alliances and economic agreements/control. Here, in most of the
cases, Russian geopolitics has to compete with geopolitical plans of other strong states, namely the
US, the EU and China. The struggles often result in the destabilization of smaller states and the
development  of an insecure situation for states placed within Russian spheres of influence,  i.e.
border states such as, for example, Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan). 
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Chapter 1. Introduction
The following Chapter is the starting point of my thesis. Therefore, here I give the introductory
information related to the main topic of this thesis. The Chapter includes discussions related to: the
problem area, the research question and working questions. Also, overview of other chapters of the
thesis is made in this Chapter. 
1.1 Problem area
The topic of this thesis is both theoretically complex and politically important. The geopolitics
of Russia is based on its ambitions of the ex-empire, on the notion of державность [derzhavnost;
superpower, world power1], which was inherited from the Russian Empire and the USSR. Today
Russia has strong military power, including nuclear weapons, large energy resources that are used
for geopolitical purposes, and a position in the international community symbolically made visible
through different projects such as the Olympic games in Sochi in 2014 and the soccer game (FIFA
World Cup) in 2018, besides active participation in international organizations and new institutions
like for example, BRICS.  
All these actions of the Russian government have influence not only within Russia, but in its
neighborhood and to some extent on a global scale. Therefore, understanding Russian geopolitics
and  its  key  constitutive  elements,  as  well  as  understanding  the  relations  between  the  Russian
geopolitics and the geopolitics of the US, the EU and China is essential for current international
relations. These processes and relations have significant impacts on the smaller states that border
Russia,  where  the  clash  of  different  external  powers  could  result  in  the  escalation  of  separate
movements or even civil wars (the examples are Georgia and Ukraine).  
From  the  perspective  of  a  student  of  Global  Studies  it  is  important  to  have  a  sound
understanding of the energy geopolitics of different states and, especially, world powers. Energy is
the backbone of the economy and the security of energy supplies is vital for survival of any country.
Also, the dispersion of energy resources is not equal over the planet, so the resource-rich states tend
to use their privileged position in political games. Russia is a very good example of politicization of
energy market and gas supplies. 
Therefore, the problem area of this thesis covers the issues of Russian geopolitics, geopolitics
of  world  powers,  regional  geopolitics  and  energy  policy.  All  these  issues  are  taken  from  the
1 According to Merriam-Webster Dictionary, world power is a political unit (nation or state) powerful enough to
affect the entire world by its influence or actions. Accessed 1 June 2015. <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/world%20power>
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perspective of different actors, but with Russia as the focal point of the analysis. So, the problem
area is intimately related to a particular country, namely Russia, and its relations with the world
community through its geopolitics and energy relations. 
Geopolitical perspectives within this thesis is divided into two areas of discussion. The first
part of this engagement  analyzes the geopolitical concepts of Russia, the US, the EU and China
from a  theoretical  perspective.  Here  the  geopolitical  ideas  of  global  powers  are  analyzed  and
compared with each other with a special focus on Russia. The second aspect of this engagement
discusses the geopolitics of the above-mentioned powers from an empirical perspective. The areas
where their interests clash and the areas where they collaborate are explored via different cases. 
From an empirical perspective evidence of the aggressive energy geopolitics of Russia can be
seen in its relations to its biggest customer (the European states), to transit states (Ukraine, Belarus),
to smaller customers (post-soviet states) and toward the energy-rich countries that transit oil and gas
through Russia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan).
Numerous debates in academic circles on how to understand Russian energy geopolitics are
rooted in the understanding that Russia’s place in current international relations (Voloshin 2014).
With the nostalgic legacy of the USSR and memories of a bipolar world, Russian ambitions do not
shrink to the level of a regional power. At the same time, other world powers, the US, the EU and
China, understand that the potential of Russia is much weaker than the USSR's. Therefore, the main
tension in international relations regarding Russia and other influential countries is the conflict of
interests between Russian ambitions and the reality, where Russian international position does not
meet Russians geopolitical ambitions.   
1.2 Research question
How can we understand the Russian geopolitical concept and how does Russian geopolitics
relate  to  other  actors  at  the  global,  regional  and local  levels  with  particular  focus  on energy
geopolitics?
1.3 Working questions
● How can we understand the Russian geopolitical concept?
● How can we understand the US, the EU and Chinese geopolitical concepts and how do they
relate to the Russian geopolitical concept?
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● How does the Russian geopolitical idea and its relationship to other world powers influence
other, smaller, states?
The first working question will help to evaluate the idea of Russian geopolitics in details. The
development of the Russian geopolitical idea, its history, current authors and main trends will be
presented and discussed. Also, the place of energy geopolitics, particularly gas geopolitics, within
the overall geopolitical concept of Russia will be discussed.
The second working question will help to understand the Russian geopolitical concept within
international  relations.  How  does  the  Russian  geopolitical  idea  correlate  or  collaborate  with
geopolitical ideas from other world powers? This question is aimed to cover conceptual aspects of
geopolitics  of  different  countries  regarding  Russia  and  cases  that  revealed  the  examples  of
geopolitical games between the states.
The third working question allows me to explore how Russian geopolitical  ideas influence
other, smaller, states. This is important because most of the time strong states do not go into open
conflict with each other, and the main fields of struggle are the areas of influence which include
minor states. Therefore, states that share borders Russia have to deal with competitive policy of
different external powers. 
1.4 Chapter overview
Chapter 1
The purpose of this chapter is to give introductory information about the thesis. The main focus
is presenting the problem area and the research question.
Chapter 2
The purpose of this chapter is to show the methodology used in the thesis. The main focus of
this chapter is to discuss the methodological approaches and issues related to the methodology of
securitisation  theory and the research question.
Chapter 3
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the theoretical framework of the thesis analysis. The
main  focus  of  this  chapter  is  to  generally  introduce  the  securitisation  theory  and  to  show its
application to the thesis topic.
Chapter 4
The purpose of this chapter is to present the Russian geopolitical idea. This will be done by
answering Working Question 1: How can we understand the Russian geopolitical  concept? The
main focus of this chapter is to show the historical development of Russian geopolitical concepts,
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the current state of academic and political debate regarding it, and the place of energy geopolitics
within the general geopolitical concept. 
Chapter 5 
In this chapter I will answer the first part of my Working Question 2: How can we understand
the US geopolitical concept and how does it relate to the Russian geopolitical concept? The purpose
of this chapter is to present the US geopolitics in common and its policy toward Russia. The main
focus of this chapter is the relations of the US geopolitical concept with Russian geopolitics and
evaluation of specific areas where their geopolitical ambitions clashes.
Chapter 6
In  this  chapter  I  will  answer  the  second  part  of  my  Working  Question  2:  How  can  we
understand the EU geopolitical concept and how does it relate to the Russian geopolitical concept?
The purpose of this chapter is to present the EU geopolitical position and its policy towards Russia.
The  main  focus  of  this  chapter  is  the  relations  of  the  EU geopolitical  concepts  with  Russian
geopolitics and evaluating of existing relations and tensions between them.
Chapter 7
In this chapter I will answer the last part of my Working Question 2: How can we understand
China’s  geopolitical  concept  and  how  does  it  relate  to  the  Russian  geopolitical  concept?  The
purpose of this chapter is to present the Chinese geopolitical position and its policy towards Russia.
The  main  focus  of  this  chapter  is  the  relations  of  China's  geopolitical  concepts  with  Russian
geopolitics and evaluation of existing relations and tensions between them.
Chapter 8
In this chapter I will answer my Working Question 3: How do the Russian geopolitical ideas
and its relationship to other world powers influence other, smaller, states?  The main focus of this
chapter is to show the existing situation within international relations regarding Russian geopolitics
and to discuss the possibilities of future conflicts as a result of Russian ambitions.
Chapter 9
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the findings of the previous chapters and write the
outcome of the thesis.    
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Chapter 2. Methodology
This  chapter  will  focus  upon  methodological  aspects  of  this  thesis.  The  methodological
approach  and issues  related  to  analysis  of  the  problem area  and the  research  question  will  be
discussed in this chapter, just as my personal position as a master’s student of the Global Studies
program will be discussed.
2.1 A personal note
My primary motivation in choosing the current topic for my master thesis is  founded on the
geopolitical  situation in  which the country of my origin,  Azerbaijan,  is  trapped. As part  of the
Russian Empire and then the USSR, Azerbaijan was under the direct control of Moscow for a very
long period. With the collapse of the USSR, Azerbaijan obtained independence and a chance to
develop in its own democracy and begin a process of Europeanization. The start-up position of
Azerbaijan was very beneficial because of its huge oil and gas resources, and the interest of Western
countries  in  energy  diversification.  But  the  escalation  of  separatist  movements  in  Nagorno-
Karabakh,  further  military  conflict  with  Armenia  that  was backed  by  Russia,  resulted  in  the
occupation of 20% of the Azerbaijani territory and huge economic losses (Abilov 2013). Currently,
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of the “frozen conflicts” of the post-soviet territory. Russia
holds military bases in the territory of Armenia. This is claimed as the guarantee for Armenian
security against Azerbaijan but is in fact to increase Russia’s leverage in relation to Armenia (and by
implication Azerbaijan). At the same time, the possibility that this conflict might escalate is used by
Russia to influence Azerbaijan and keep it from a more active integration into European political
and economic processes.        
Therefore,  as  many other  states  bordering  Russia,  Azerbaijan  was  in  the  way of  Russian
hegemony ambitions, and my choice of this topic is based on the quest to find  a place for the
Azerbaijani  nation  within  the  global  framework  of  comprehensive  relations  between  Russian
geopolitics and geopolitics of the US, the EU and China.
It should be mentioned, that due to the potential high political impact of Russian geopolitical
articles, from the perspective of Azerbaijan, Russia is seen as a pure danger. That creates a problem
of one-way thinking towards the problem area. Therefore, to overcome this issue the appropriate
theoretical framework should safeguard against such bias (but I acknowledge it is difficult).
2.2 Theoretical approach in methodology
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In order to find an appropriate theoretical concept to review the Russian geopolitics as unbiased
or objectively as possible the main goals of the analysis was taken into consideration. The primary
aim of this thesis is to understand Russian geopolitics from inside and what does it means for other
world  powers  and  smaller  states  (the  whole  world).  After  analyzing  a  number  of  articles  and
academic works related to Russian policy and place in international relations, it became clear to me
that the concept of ‘threat to national security’ is the basis of almost all geopolitical ideas of Russian
authors.     
Therefore, the theoretical approach of this thesis will be based upon the theory of securitisation
by  Ole  Wæver  and  Barry  Buzan  (1995;  1998).   Key  aspects  of  the  securitisation  theory  are
interestingly very close to the current Russian geopolitical discourses by its language and contains
the  concept  of  a  threat  as  an  issue  as  well  as  appliance  of  ‘exceptional  means’.  Processes  of
securitisation through speech-act and the creation of security threats described in theory could be
easily traced in different  aspects of Russian geopolitics – for example,  the creation of hysteria
around  radicalisation  of  Ukraine  in  Russian  media.  This  theory  is  partially  based  on  a  realist
political  concept  (Williams  2013)  that  potentially  provides  a  framework  for  understanding  the
energy geopolitics of Russia and its relations with other states. This is important because people
working  in  Russian  economic  and  political  state  agencies  and  institutions  are  former  Soviet
bureaucrats or have a Soviet educational background. This background, I suggest, influences their
current vision of international relations, economic policy and power games as a struggle between
Western liberal democratic ideas and Russian national sovereignty concepts.
2.3 Empirical choices
Russian energy geopolitics is part of a wider topic of Russian state geopolitics, that is, in turn, a
part  of  international  relations  studies.  Therefore,  to  analyze  it,  the  works  of  Russian  political
scientists and politicians, data from international energy institutions, and publications of different
geopolitical scholars were taken into consideration (Dugin 1997, 2007; Nartov 1999; Panarin 2006;
Putin 2001, 2007, 2013; Russian International Affairs Council 2012, 2013).  
The main sources to evaluate the Russian geopolitical idea were original texts in the Russian
language.  The most  important  ones  are  works  of  Russian  political  and geopolitical  academics,
speeches and publications of current politicians and official documents of Russian governments and
Russian state agencies. The key problem that I have faced writing about Russian geopolitics was
limitations related to language specificity and translation issues. Russian political discourses are full
of terminology that does not have totally matching analogue in English language (for example,
derjavnost or russkiy mir). To deal with mentioned issues I used on-line resources such as, courses
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and materials about academic writing and academic translation. Therefore, the chapter dedicated to
Russian geopolitics is based on my own analysis of primary sources. 
To compare geopolitics of Russia with other world powers, analytical articles of both Russian
and foreign scientists were evaluated and used. Due the lack of access to hard copy sources about
Russian  politics,  I  used  mostly scanned  versions  of  official  materials  that  are  available  in  the
Internet. For the chapters dedicated to the US, the EU and Chinese geopolitics secondary texts,
mostly in English, were used. The data on oil and gas industry is taken from such prominent sources
as the BP statistical review of world energy, International Energy Agency (IEA) and Eurostat.
2.4 Different methods
The  securitisation  concept  provided  a  framework  to  describe  the  politics  of  the  state  on
different  levels,  namely global,  regional  and domestic.  Therefore,  it  is  impossible  to  develop a
unique  methodological  approach within  the  securitisation  theory (Munster  2012).  To provide  a
sufficient methodology for successful research I, in this thesis, apply a combination of different
logical  methods  to  study  the  material.  The  main  part  is  logical  methods,  namely  deduction,
induction, analogy, extrapolation and comparison (Rothchild 2006; Biela 1991; Lewis-Beck et al
2004; Ragin 1987).
Such  a  set  of  research  methods  is  chosen  because  this  thesis  covers  actors  with  different
potential and influence in international relations and with different interests and policy instruments.
Therefore,  an  observer  could  see  future  actions  on  the  basis  of  premises,  or  repetition  of  past
actions,  also  matching  different  actors  to  reveal  similarities  and  principal  differences  of  their
geopolitics, and projecting the current trend of internal or external policy in the short-term and long-
term future. 
Additionally, various qualitative and quantitative empirical research methods (Burns 2000) are
employed for the purposes of this thesis. The most important ones are evaluation of different cases
in oil and gas policy and content analysis. Content analysis focuses on speeches and interviews of
political leaders, mostly of Russian politicians. Also, document analysis (Bowen 2009) was widely
used to prepare core parts of the thesis. Official state documents cover most of the issues of state
policy and are a rich source of information. The last method that was employed is observation.
Because the gas and oil market is a very dynamic phenomenon, it is important to follow the latest
trends both in the energy market and in international politics. Wars, economic conflicts and other
issues of international relations play a significant role in this market. 
2.5 Limitations
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The main limitation of this thesis is that it is impossible to cover all aspects of the geopolitics
of Russia within a Master Thesis. Empirically, the geopolitics of Russia covers the whole Eurasian
continent where it faces the geopolitical interests of world powers, such as the US, the EU and
China.  Huge amounts of data  are  available  on each of their  relationships  and detailed analysis
require much more detailed academic work.
The other  limiting issue is  that  energy markets  are  volatile  and sensitive  to  non-economic
influences, namely the political climate in regions and on a global level. Therefore, geopolitical
trends observed today could change rapidly in a very short time in the future and it is hard to
foresee the future of international energy relations.
The problem of the historical bases of this thesis is solved by focusing on conceptual issues.
Because geopolitical ideas and policies develop over long periods and seldom changed rapidly, the
analysis  and  findings  of  this  thesis  will  be  ‘realistic’ and  can  provide  a  good  foundation  for
understanding Russian geopolitics and its relations to other world powers as well as smaller states,
at least for the foreseeable  future. The data that is used in this work covers the time frame from the
beginning of the 1990s till April 2015.
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 Chapter 3. Theory and analytical framework
The purpose of this chapter is to present a theoretical framework that can be used to analyze the
Russian geopolitics and the geopolitical  strategies  of other  world powers  (the US,  the EU and
China).  At  the  first  glance  ideas  of  Realpolitik  could  cover  topics  of  geopolitics  and  energy
geopolitics. But the current processes within international relations go beyond realistic notions and
a more comprehensive framework is required. Therefore, securitisation  theory will be used as it is a
flexible  framework  that  can  be  adapted  and used  to  analyze  the  different  political  systems  of
unequal states (Waever 2014).    
This chapter presents the basic aspects of securitisation  theory and discusses its value for this
thesis. The framework developed in this chapter will be used in a subsequent chapters where the
Russian  geopolitical  idea  is  presented  and the  Russian  geopolitical  idea  relates  to  other  world
powers geopolitical strategies. 
3.1 Securitisation theory
The securitisation  theory is originally produced by the Copenhagen school of security studies,
namely by Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, but has been further developed by a whole range of other
researchers. Securitisation  theory focuses on speech-acts that define what is a security threat.  It
does not state on this is a ‘real’ problem or issue so what if a security threat is socially constructed
phenomenon? Is this a problem? No, because in this case the question of the reality of the threat is
not the starting point. What constitutes as a security threat, according to the approach can differ
considerably and can in principle  be applied to  any issue (migration,  education,  etc.)  (Munster
2012).
In order to become a security issue the speech-act should fulfill a specific rhetorical structure.
The key elements of the theory of particular relevance for this thesis includes: the ‘referent object’
should be claimed to be a ‘vital threat’, with demands for ‘extraordinary rights’ to face the threat.
This justifies ‘exceptional means’ to be applied within the society to deal with the threat (Buzan et
al 1998: 35-41). 
The core assumptions of securitisation  theory are the following: 
● The centrality of audience. The focal audience is the audience that has a direct connection
with the securitizing claim, and has the ability to legitimize the securitising actor to use measures
against the perceived threat. It is essential that the focal audience accepts the securitising issue for
its successful implementation of securitisation.  Basically this means that the focal audience must
agree with the claims of the securitising actor.
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● The co-dependency of the agency and context. This means that from the semantic point of
view the securitization move is  the combination of textual  meaning and cultural  meaning.  The
former means the knowledge of the concepts acquired through spoken and written language; the
latter means the knowledge gained through previous interactions and current situations. Therefore,
the  performance  of  securitisation   process  is  based  on  semantic  regularity  and  contextual
circumstances. 
● The dispositif  and the  structuring  force  of  practices.  Because  securitisation  occurs  in  a
struggling  environment,  it  uses  inter-subjective  practices  and  tools  from different  social  fields.
Moreover,  different  practices  are  connected  with  securitisation  acts.  Security  practices  include:
regulatory instruments and capacity tools. Regulatory instruments are policy instruments that aim is
to control the behavior of social actors. Capacity tools include skills that allow individuals, groups
and agencies to make decisions and carry out activities. Basically, these tools are used to propagate
discipline upon individuals and groups through information, training, force and etc. (Balzacq 2010).
According to the Copenhagen School public issues could range from a non-politicized issue to
politicize and to securitize. Therefore, the government does not focus on non-politicized questions,
but the state policy pays close attention to politicized issues. In extreme cases, when the issue is
securitized,  the  extraordinary political  measures  that  are  beyond the scopes  of  normal  political
frames  are  justified  by  existential  threats  (real  or  perceived).  The  change  of  issue  from  the
politicized into the securitized is called an “act of securitisation” (Emmers 2013). 
The securitisation act basically consists of a security act and a political act. The first includes
usage of the language of security and propaganda of extraordinary counter measures; the second
includes a political will to view the threat in such a way as to convince the focal audience (Emmers
2013).
In practice, the securitisation process has two stages: creation of a particular security issue and
convincing the audience to accept the fact of an ‘existential threat’ of a particular referent object. At
the first stage, the actor that provides the securitisation  (state, movement, etc.) justifies that some
issues, including processes, situations, individuals, groups of people or an entity, is an existential
threat to the survival of a target object. These issues are claimed to be more important than others
by labelling them national or international security issues. Then, at the second stage, the securitizing
actor must persuade the particular audience (civil society, intellectuals, farmers, peasants, military
officers) that the referent object is in danger. After the success of the second stage, the actor that
provides the securitisation  act could use extraordinary political measures to deal with the security
threat (Emmers 2013).
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3.2. The scope of the theory
The framework of securitisation  theory is used in this thesis to explain diverse strategies used
by different  world  powers.  The strength  of  securitisation   theory is  that  within  the  concept  of
speech-act  anything  could  potentially  be  brought  into  the  focus  as  a  security  issue  (Williams
2013:513). Therefore, different states could be analyzed in the scope of one theory.  For example,
the US uses the concept of democratization (or lack of democracy) to intervene in different regions
and countries and justifies it as a security issue that threatens the US interests. China uses more
national, or Sino-centric, strategies and Russia claims that the uni-polarity of the world is a global
threat.  
At the same time, concepts of security and political acts within the securitisation  process and
stages of securitisation  processes help to find differences in the geopolitical strategies of different
countries.  Depending  on  the  state,  the  threat  could  be  territory,  military  occupation  or  more
complicated  ideas  such  as  the  level  of  global  influence,  values  of  a  nation  within  the  world
community or questions pertaining to energy. The means that the scope of  sensitive issues that
could potentially be securitised and used in internal and external policies of the state are vast.
Therefore, the securitisation  theory is used in this thesis as a general frame to cover processes
within international relations with a particular focus on geopolitical issues. At the same time some
aspects of geopolitics, particularly energy geopolitics, is considered in detail, using steps involved
in the securitisation  process and speech-act concept. 
The practical implementation of securitisation  theory within this thesis  is an evaluation of
official political agendas of different states. Russia, for example, where the concept of русский мир
[russkiy mir; Russian World] is taken as the cornerstone of the strength and power of the Russian
nation, and because this idea is construed as threatened by Ukraine, the military forces were used to
occupy Crimea, despite the international principle of inviolability of state frontiers. Additionally to
justify the actions and use patriotic feelings of the Russian population the media in Russia focuses
on propaganda of the idea of  russkiy mir and the importance of current political policy for the
glorious future of Russia. 
A second practical application of the theory is the evaluation of different states as actors within
international relations. Because the securitisation  process is relatively open, the capacity of the
actor to make security claims is important. Basically not all actors have the same level of influence,
and respectively the effectiveness of securitisation  policy is also different (Williams 2013:514). So,
the security projects that are started by the most powerful states will gather more attention from the
world community, and also support, while in the case of less powerful states such initiatives will
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face indifference or resistance. Within this thesis the gas geopolitics of Russia could be an example.
As the energy resource is claimed to be the backbone of national security, the means of delivery,
particularity pipelines, are at the center of the securitisation  policy of Russia. But Russia does not
shrink its ambitions to the regional level. Therefore, the current Russian pipeline policy does not
just cover its own resource base, it also includes delivery of Central Asian resources and control
over post-soviet territories. Russia, due the lack of power and influence at an international level,
faces the resistance of transit and importer states.   
A further  practical  application  of  securitisation   theory  is  the  identity  concept  (Williams
2013:518). In the case of Russia this concept is tightly bound with the concept of state sovereignty.
The Russia political elite identifies state sovereignty as being under threat from the influence of the
Western  civilization,  namely  from  democracy  and  liberal  ideas.  Therefore,  to  securitise  its
sovereignty Russia has to develop its own version of democracy and rules of statehood. Part of this
is to construe  the identity of the Russian nation to be under threat of disintegration and being
misled by Western ideas, to such an extent that it  could become extinct in the future. Problems of
securitisation of  the Russian nation,  its  culture,  its  history is  emphasized in  media and official
political discourses.
Also, the securitisation  theory is used in the analysis of ongoing political processes. Political
leaders, especially in authoritarian governments (but also more broadly), put an emphasis not only
on real threats and issues, but on popular problems, even though they are not so essential for the
well-being of the state. The main reason for this is the basis of a given country's problems most of
the time is grounded in management problems, vague politics, and corruption. Therefore, to remain
in power official policies sometimes securitize issues that could not be solved in reality or in the
foreseeable future. In the Russian example, as was mentioned earlier, uni-polarity of the world and
the undeniable leadership of the US are claimed as threats for Russian security. At the same time the
question of the Russian economy and its total  dependence on the export of energy resources is
ignored as a threat. Oil and gas projects are put into the position of national projects and in case that
other states or powers oppose projects they are claimed to be  национал-предатели [natsional-
predateli; national betrayers].
3.3 Summary
In summary, the main features of securitisation  theory makes it a very flexible framework for
security studies. Securitisation is a political choice (Williams 2013:520). Rationalization of security
issues  is  a  political  process.  All  countries  use  the  construction of  security threats  to  justify its
policies and try to unite the nation for mobilization of support. 
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In the case of Russian geopolitics, and particularly energy geopolitics, the same structure could
be  seen.  Demonization  of  the  Western  world,  seeing  the  US  as  the  origin  of  Russian
underdevelopment, evaluating all actions of the EU to diversify energy sources as a national threat
of Russia,  these are  all  examples of securitisation policy.  Therefore,  the real  security issues  of
Russia,  such as the collapse of  the economy and crises  of  governance are ignored by political
discourses and official media. 
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Chapter 4: The Concept(s) of Russian Geopolitics
In this chapter the concept of Russian geopolitics will be presented and discussed. To cope with
this task, the different Russian traditions of statehood will be taken into account. Accordingly, at
first,  a brief history of the Russian geopolitical idea will  be presented.  Then, I will  discuss the
current status of the Russian geopolitical conceptualization,  which includes presenting the main
academic discourses and the official position of the Russian government.
The  chapter  attempts  to  answer  the  first  Working  Question:  How  can  we  understand  the
Russian geopolitical concept? The main aim of this chapter is to present and discuss the position of
energy geopolitics,  and  particularly  gas  geopolitics,  within  the  general  geopolitical  strategy of
Russia. Are gas supplies only a tool or a weapon, and has gas-politics a value as part of the broader
international game? Or, is it core and plays a significant role in the creation of general Russian
geopolitics? 
4.1 History of Russian geopolitical idea
The first Russian geopolitical idea was generated in XV century by the monk Filofei2. This
concept was Москва – третий Рим [Moskva – tretiy Rim; Moscow – the third Rome]. The main
thesis  was that  Russia  is  the  last  kingdom of  Orthodox Christianity,  the  only successor  of  the
Byzantine Empire. Even the emblem of Palaeologus, the last imperial dynasty of the Eastern Roman
Empire, is identical with to the  State Emblem of  Russian Empire, and currently Russian Federation
(Panarin 2006). This general concept could be traced throughout the history of the Tsarist Russia,
before and during the Romanov dynasty. One of the main goals of the politics promoted by this
conceptualization of geopolitics was to conquer Constantinople or Istanbul, as the ideological center
of the Orthodox Church that was embedded in the Ottoman Empire at that time.
The  other  concepts  that  were  developed  during  the  Russian  Empire  period  were:
Западничество [Zapadnichestvo;  Westernism]  and  Славянофильство [Slavanofilstvo;
Slavophile].  Both  of  these  ideological  movements  appeared  in  the  19th century  and  had  a
contradictory basis. Zapadnichestvo sees the future of Russia tightly related to Europe and focused
on  the  development  of  Russia  by  the  western  pattern3.  This  means  adoption  of  the  European
development path with long-term goal to become an inseparable part of Europe, including culture,
legislation, technology, and social aspects. Slavanofilstvo in contrast was developed to present the
2 Филофей [Filofey] – monk of Pskov Eleazar Monastery, writer and publicist. Lived in 1st half of XVI century. 
Source: The Institute of Russian Literature (the Pushkin House), Russian Academy of Sciences. Accessed 1 June 
2015. <http://www.pushkinskijdom.ru/Default.aspx?tabid=3173>
3 Source: Encyclopædia Britannica. Accessed 1 June 2015. 
<http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/640986/Westernizer>
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idea of a special  mission of the Russian nation,  in relation to all  other Slavic nations,  and the
inevitability of confrontation with the West (Panarin 2006). On this basis Danilevski created the
Панславизм [Panslavism; Pan-Slavophile] concept of Russian future. In this concept he claims that
“from the general historical and cultural points of view Russia could not be considered as a part of
Europe.  Russia has two possibilities:  first  of all  to create independent cultural  unity with other
Slavic nations, or second to lose any cultural and historical value; become nothing” (Danilevski
1869: Chapter 15).    
The  situation  changes  with  the  Bolshevik  Revolution  in  1917.  Soviet  Russia  rejected  the
ideologies of the Russian Empire. The idea of the World Proletarian Revolution4 was adopted by
Lenin and Trotsky (Krasnov 2005). But with the rise of Stalin state policy it became more realistic
and focused on the revival of the new Soviet state. Therefore, the concept of National Bolshevism5
was adopted in domestic and international relations of the USSR. It should be mentioned that till the
1980s geopolitics in the USSR was considered as pseudoscience (Nartov 1999). The Great Soviet
Encyclopedia defines geopolitics as: “bourgeois, reactionary concept that perversely uses the data
of physical and economic geography to justify and conduct propaganda of the aggressive policy of
imperialist states”6.      
In  parallel,  among  Russian  emigrant  society  in  1920th the  concept  of  Евразийство
[Evraziystvo; Eurasianism] was developed. This concept links Russian identity with great Eurasia
empires (for example, Mongol Empire) (Mamontov 1999). The revival of this ideology was related
to  L.  Gumilev's  theory  of  ethnogenesis  [Пассионарная  теория  этногенеза;  Passionarnaya
teoriya etnogeneza] in the 1980s. Within this theory Gumilev defined “super ethnos” as a group of
ethnoses  that  inhabit  different  climate  zone but  united  in  one  society.  Also,  he  introduced  the
definition of “passionarity” – special biochemical energy that helps to make “super efforts” (Titov
2005:52,  70).  It  should  be  mentioned,  that  this  concept  is  actively  used  by  current  Russian
academics  that  support  the Neo-Eurasianism idea.  In  this  case  Russia  is  identified  as  a  “super
ethnos”.   
After the collapse of the USSR, Russia departed from the communist concepts and faced an
ideological vacuum. In that situation (during the 1990s) further development of the state was linked
to a plurality of concepts most of which drew on the previous concepts of Westernism, National
4 The World Proletarian Revolution is idea that, according to Marx and Engels doctrines, the October Revolution of 
1917 will the start of global revolution against capitalism. Source: Russian Geopolitical Encyclopedia. Accessed 1 
June 2015. <http://dergachev.ru/Russian-encyclopaedia/12/82.html> 
5 Political and ideological movement that combine ideas of bolshevism and nationalism. Source: Modern Dictionary 
of Russian language by Yefremova. Accessed 1 June 2015. 
<http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/efremova/277059/%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BD
%D0%B0%D0%BB>
6 Source: The Great Soviet Encyclopedia. Accessed 1 June 2015. <http://bse.chemport.ru/geopolitika.shtml>
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Bolshevism, Neo-Eurasianism, and increasingly Russian Nationalism.
4.2 Current geopolitical concepts of Russia
Current Russian authors that work in the field of Russian geopolitics use in addition to these
concepts, the concepts and terms borrowed from classic schools of geopolitics. The most influential
ones are: the Heartland Theory of Mackinder, the Rimland theory of  Spykman, and some variation
of the Clash of Civilizations theory of Huntington. On a par with the academic writers, politicians in
Russia actively involved in geopolitical disputes along with current president (2015) of the Russian
Federation, Vladimir Putin.
One of the most influential political scientists of Russia, with close relations with the Kremlin,
is A. Dugin (1997, 2007). He is an active provider material and arguments for the notion of Neo-
Eurasianism.  His  works  are  based  on the idea  of  dualism,  particularly land versus  sea.  In  this
concept Russia is the Heartland, not the East or the West. The main geopolitical goal of Russia is
the creation of an empire. This aim is closely related to an understanding of geopolitics that focus
on the strategic position and sovereignty of Russia. To achieve strong positions in international
arenas  Russia  must  restore  control  over  its  direct  neighbors,  restore  the  alliance  with  Eastern
European countries, create a strategic alliance with Western states (primarily France and Germany),
and Eastern states (primary Iran, India, and Japan). The main precondition for success of the empire
is possession of intercontinental nuclear weapons (Dugin 1997). 
Examples  of  specific  strategic  actions  to  reach  the  new  empire  are  the  following:  1.)  if
Azerbaijan keep its Turkish orientation - Turkey is a NATO member, representative of Western
world – this  country should  be divided between Iran,  Russia,  and Armenia; 2.)  Ukraine as an
independent state with territorial ambitions is great danger for the whole Eurasia so the  absolute
Russian  geopolitical  goal  on  Black  Sea  is  to  control  the  coastline  from Ukraine  till  Abkhazia
territory; 3.) Belarus should be considered as a part of Russia so any attempt at creating a closer
relationship to European countries is seen as a threat to Russian interests and integrity;4.) China is a
very  dangerous  neighbor  of  Russia  in  South,  the  main  dangerous  consequence  of  friendship
between China and Russia is demographic conquest of Siberia; 5.) the new geopolitical rule in
Caucasus  should  be  based  on  center  –  periphery  principle,  with  rejection  of  the  state  –  state
relationships (Dugin 1997). 
The national identity of Russia is considered ‘solid’ from the struggle with the  world power
represented by the US, and conduction of independent policies towards all others. But Western,
Atlantic policy makers (the US in principle) creates “cordon sanitaire”7 around Russia to prevent its
7 Cordon Sanitaire – a protective barrier (as of buffer states) against a potentially aggressive nation or a dangerous 
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alliance with Europe, the Islamic world, and China. One of the examples of this policy is “color
revolution”8 in  Kiev  and  other  post-soviet  countries  that  struggle  with  ‘democratization’ in  an
attempt to push Russia out of CIS9 region. Considering energy geopolitics Dugin emphasizes that
gas is the main basis of Russia-EU relations (Dugin 2007). 
I. Panarin (2006) is the other representative of Neo-Eurasianism. In his view, Eurasian Russia is
the global Russian project: the Russian reaction to the challenges of globalization. In this aspect
Russia could become an energy power only if  the “continental  arc” will  be achieved. It  means
strategic alliance between France, Germany, Russia, China, India, and Iran. Additionally, Russia
and CIS states should create transcontinental transport and energy axis. This process has started
with the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community in 2000. Strategic actions that should
be taken in order to create the economic basis for the Eurasian Russia axis is based on energy
projects. Specifically, oil and gas pipelines with Germany, Turkey, Greece, Korea, Japan, and China
are essential, and are able to change the picture of global geopolitics (Panarin 2006). 
Other Russia-related geopolitical concerns related to “neo-colonialism” issues. V. Dergachev is
the representative of this camp. The main claim is that with the collapse of the USSR, Russia is
confronted  with  new wars  and  a  new epoch  of  “political  correctness”  (Dergachev  2014b)  has
started. The goal of this struggle is not different, it is to increase influence on different territories,
but the methods are based on “soft power”10 and “controlled chaos”11. In its expansion, the EU is
using communist tactics, while the USSR exported the idea of World Revolution, West exports the
idea of Liberal Revolution, with democracy and human rights as the universal values of humanity.
This movement of Europe towards Eurasia is linked with humanitarian intervention of the US in
order to change the regime of sovereign states and create subordinated countries. The example of
such intervention is activities to include Ukraine in the free trade zone with the EU. It could be
assessed as a geopolitical move to weaken Russia (Dergachev 2014b).
One of the original concepts in Russian geopolitics was made by V. Tsimburski. His   concept
influence (as an ideology). Source: Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Accessed 1 June 2015. <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/cordon%20sanitaire>
8 Color Revolution is nonviolent means of protest culminating in an overthrow of an oppressive government. Source: 
Daily Bell. Accessed 1 June 2015. <http://www.thedailybell.com/definitions/params/id/1813/> 
9 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is an international organisation that was created in December 1991. 
Member states are post-soviet countries. The main goal of it is to provide and excelerate integration processes.
Source: CIS internet portal. Accessed 2 June 2015. <http://www.e-cis.info/page.php?id=19397> 
10 Soft Power is comprehensive toolkit to address foreign policy objectives relying on the capacity of civil society, 
information, communication, humanitarian and other methods and technologies alternative to classical diplomacy 
(Concept of external politics of Russia, 2013, paragraph 20). Be aware this conceptualization differ from European 
understanding of soft power which we will return to in Chapter 6.
11 Controlled Chaos is geopolitical technology of neocolonialism. With use of “soft power” and “humanitarian 
intervention” the Western countries influence countries of the Third  world to create subordinated actors of world 
politics. Source: Institute of geopolitics of Professor Dergachev. Accessed 1 June 2015. 
<http://dergachev.ru/Russian-encyclopaedia/19/26.html>
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of  “Russian  Island”  claims  that  Russia  is  alone  and  must  be  alone.  Russia  is  separated  from
European countries, that have liberal roots, by the zone of nations and territories that share borders
with Europe, but not included in it, the so called strait-territories. And with the end of the USSR,
west-oriented  imperial  period  of  Russian  history,  that  lasted  280  years,  had  finished.  New
geopolitical priority should be the development of internal parts of the “Island”. On a global level
the concept view the world as one-and-a-half-polar world, where is only one leader. But its position
is  restricted  by  other  regional  centers  (Tsimbulski  1993).  Within  this  concept  the  problem  of
Chinese  intervention  and  loss  of  Primorye  region  is  considered  as  serious  issues  of  Russia
(Tsimbulski 1998). Also Tsimbulski defined Великий Лимитроф [Great Limitrophe], the area that
has direct contact with “Russian Island”. The Great Limitrophe includes: Eastern Europe, Caucasus,
Central  Asia,  Mongolia,  Inner  Mongolia  (part  of  China),  Russian  autonomies  from  Tuva  to
Buryatia. This close location with “Island” influence the behavior of countries within that region
and, when Russia is becoming weaker as a state, nations of the Limitrophe could choose anti-Russia
position. For example, the realization of Caspian-Mediterranean oil project is considered an anti-
Russian project (Tsimbulski 1996).
It  should  be  mentioned,  that  some  political  analysts,  like  S.  Belkovsky,  criticize  current
geopolitics of Russia. In his view Putin's regime is not sufficiently focusing on  strengthening the
position of Russia on post-soviet regions. Even through Putin's policy has the goal to make a border
country dependent and a subordinated appendix of huge Russian corporations, with the “Gazprom”
on the top this is not considered effective enough (Karpyuk 2007). 
As  was  mentioned  before,  Russian  politicians  are  actively  involved  in  discussion  of  the
geopolitical future of Russia. Some of them admit that military and ideological potential of Russia
has  decreased.  Therefore  the  factor  of  energy becomes  the  primary ‘tool’ both  in  internal  and
external (foreign) affairs of Russia. A new, multi-polar world should be created on the basis of
energy relationships. According to Y. Shafranik the geopolitical goal of Russia is not to struggle for
pipelines from Central Asia and Caucasus, but to explore these resources, in collaboration with
‘partners’, without the creation of competition between suppliers of energy resources (Shafranik
2001).
Other  politicians  have  a  more  ambitious  vision  of  Russian  geopolitics.  For  example,  V.
Zhirinovsky,  the  leader  of  the  Liberal-Democratic  Party,  claims  that  Russian  nation  should  be
treated as a special ‘civilization’, and after the collapse of the USSR Russians become a divided
nation. In this geopolitical perspective Ukraine and Belarus should unite with Russia, and in the
border-states friendly or neutral political regimes should be established. Also, the Western world is
accused of hindering the modernization process of other countries, including Russia (Zhirinovsky
23
1998).  A similar  position has the leader  of the Communist  Party,  G. Zyuganov. He agrees  that
Russians are the biggest divided nation in the world. And the vital purpose of Russia is to cover
with its protection all Russians, that is all who consider Russia the homeland. From another point of
view, Russia should protect its historical individuality, and spirituality from external, aggressive
influence (Zyuganov 2004).   
Trying  to  justify  the  special  position  of  Russia  in  the  world,  the  concept  of  “sovereign
democracy”  was  employed.  This  concept  was  popularized  by  V.  Surkov,  from  the  Russian
Presidential Administration.  In his speeches,  Surkov claims that Russia must remain among the
powers  that  are  involved in  global  decision-making,  because  if  Russia   leaves  the  world scale
politics and concentrated on the development of its own territory, as liberal ideology might suggest,
international decisions will be made against Russia. The Russian nation has a tradition of statehood,
and the statehood idea should be safeguarded. This is the difference between Russia and other post-
soviet states as they do not have a unique national idea and seek to enter the EU in order get a
protection. So, if Russia wants to have a democratic society, sovereignty, and to be a significant
power in international relations it should develop its own democracy (Surkov 2006).  
Representatives of the political opposition in Russia, i.e. liberal political forces, particularly B.
Nemtsov had a different point of view of the Russian geopolitical situation. He blames Putin for
spending most of his efforts on attempts to solve current problems of the “Gazprom” instead of
other more pertinent issues. This also includes the argument that most of the time the agendas of
Putin's  international  meetings  and visits  were  related  to  lobbing  of  “Gazprom's”  projects.  Gas
pipeline projects are justified as the keystone of national interests, and states that do not agree with
the construction of these projects are represented as enemies. Real national interests are scarified to
business interests of “Gazprom”. For example, the Blue Stream pipeline was constructed to bypass
Georgia, but the pricing problem with Turkey appeared after construction has been finished. On this
basis the decision was made to build South Stream to bypass Turkey12. The other issue is related to
gas conflicts with CIS countries. The “Gazprom” raised the prices and create tensions with Ukraine,
Belarus,  Georgia,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan.  Such  behavior  destroys  the  image  of  Russia  as  sound
supplier, and result that other countries accuse Russia in using gas supplies as a weapon (Nemtsov
and Milov 2008).  Boris  Nemtsov was murdered in Moscow on 27 February 2015 (BBC News
2015).
4.3 Geopolitical ideology of Vladimir Putin
In spite of political pluralism, the final decision on strategic issues is made by the President of
12 In 2014 Russia rejected South Stream. New pipeline will be through Turkey (Stern et al 2015:5).  
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Russian Federation. Since 2000 this position was held by V. Putin. Despite the fact that in 2008 –
2012 the President was D. Medvedev, Putin has maintained his influence as the Prime Minister of
Russia.  To  justify  his  actions  on  domestic  and  international  levels  he  frequently  discusses
geopolitical issues in his public speeches or articles. Some topics could be traced from his early
speeches  and  public  addresses  till  the  most  recent  ones,  but  the  general  tendency  is  that
ambitiousness increases from the early days till the present time.
Concerning internal politics, Putin claimed that Russia will not become a copy the US or the
UK with  ancient  liberal  traditions,  but  will  develop  its  own strong  state  system (Putin  1999).
Russian  democracy will  be based  on Russian  peoples'  traditions,  without  imitation  of  standard
pattern. Further, this statement was justified with Gumelev's “internal energy of nation” hypothesis,
and developed to the level that Russia is a state-civilization bound by Russian nation, language, and
culture.  In  practice,  this  concept  reflected  in  acceleration  the  process  of  issuing  of  Russian
citizenship for carriers of the Russian language and culture, for direct descendants of citizens of the
Russian Empire and the USSR (Putin 2012). The idea of internal policy was expanded to the global
level. In his speech dedicated to annexation of Crimea, Putin, after discussing that Crimea is the
focal point of stability in the region and must be protected by a strong sovereign state (which at that
moment could be only Russia),  claim that  russkiy  mir,  historical Russia is  pursuing the aim to
become unified (Putin 2014a).    
On the global world order Putin revealed his discontent with the results of the Cold War. In his
addresses to the Federal Assembly in 2005 he declared that the collapse of the USSR is the biggest
geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century (Putin 2005). In his speech at the Munich Conference
on Security Policy on 12 February 2007, Putin claims that the unipolar world is unacceptable. He
blamed  the US national legislation system for seeking influence beyond the national boundaries of
the US and for distorting the functionality of international law. At the same time, Russia as a world
power always had the privileged to develop its own, independent external policy (Putin 2007). The
main problem that Putin shows is that after the end of the bipolar world global security did not
become stronger and the US more actively uses power to shape the development of the world, by
using its (the US) power against sovereign states the US is threatening Russia (Putin 2014a). So,
without that the balance of power, the world could not be safe a place (Putin 2014b).  
As an alternative, Putin advocates the concept of multi-polar world. The basis of this world
order are the BRICS countries that become economic centers of the world and will obtain sufficient
political influence in the future (Putin 2007, Putin 2012, Putin 2014b).  
One of the main concerns of Putin's international policy is relations with the aggressive US
policies. The issue of expanding NATO allies (and military infrastructure) closer to the borders of
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Russia is included as examples the US attempts at weakening Russia (this can be seen in Strategy of
National  Security  2009).  Hypersensitivity  to  NATO  actions  is  on  the  agenda  of  almost  all
international speeches of Putin (Putin 2001, Putin 2007, Putin 2014a, Putin 2014c). The other big
issue is the installation of the new US missile defense complexes in different parts of the world
(especially in Europe). Russia is cautioned that this system could be used to limit Russian nuclear
weapon potential and the military balance between the US and Russia will be destroyed. Russia will
face this challenge by the creation of more advanced weapon system that could not be stopped by
missile defense systems (Putin 2007). Even Medvedev elaborated on this issue in his addresses to
the Federal Assembly in 2010. He mentioned that in the next decade, Russia has two alternatives:
1.) either to obtain agreement on missile defense systems and create a collaboration mechanism;  or
2.) such agreement would be impossible to reach and a new arms race will begin (Medvedev 2010).
List of less priority security issues for Russia includes: militarization of Space (Putin 2007);
utilization of “controlled chaos theory” (Putin 2012, Putin 2014b), “soft power”, and human rights
concepts for making political pressure on sovereign states, intervention in internal affairs of that
state,  create  destabilization  in  regions  (Concept  of  External  Politics  of  Russia,  2013);  “color
revolutions”, as policy against integration in Eurasia region; restriction access of Russia to new
technologies; policy of containment of Russia (Putin 2014a).          
To deal with the mentioned issues, Putin bets on a strong military system and a new East policy.
The first aspect will guarantee security and the independence of the Russian Federation. The second
aspect will be the development of a strategy for the 21th century (Putin 2012). It will become a
national priority for the new century, to develop Siberia and develop relations with the Far East
regions  of  Russia  (Putin  2013).  The key here is  the  development  of  linkages  between internal
development of gas projects with China, and the creation of pipeline infrastructure in the eastern
part of Russia (Putin 2014c). Moreover, the priority task is to create Eurasia economic area between
CIS and other state is the region (Concept of External Politics of Russia, 2013).
4.4 Securitisation issues
Russian geopolitics can be as widely using securitisation as a mode of operation in its internal
and external policy as illustrated above where a whole range of threats are created and proposed
created. The main Russian securitization object is the US foreign policy as it  is construed as a
security threat. In this case, as was discussed earlier, the primary focus of Russian security is to
oppose and block the influence of the US in post-soviet region and Eastern Europe. Securitisation
process is promoted in the Russian society via the official position of the state, political discourses,
academic discourses, and pro-government media. The most current example of securitisation policy
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is evidenced with Russian policies towards Ukraine after the recent “color revolution” (also  called
майдан [maydan] in Russian). Russian propaganda operate with such statements as, Ukraine is a
vital part of russkiy mir (RIA Novosti 2014). It is argued that Ukraine statehood collapse because of
Western influence, and NATO ambitions in Crimea is a threat to Russian security (Putin 2014a).
These ideas  are  propagated  on an official  level  by Putin and other  prominent  politicians,  with
substantial   efforts  and resources   allocated  to  media/  Internet  to  populate  security  issues  and
thereby play with (or manipulate) the patriotic feelings of the Russian nation. The main audience for
Russian securitarization is internal related to its own population as a way of mobilizing popular
support;  and externally related to its  neighbor countries  (smaller  states)  so they stay within its
sphere of influence, as well as the world powers of US, EU and China so they stay away from its
border countries. 
4.5 Summary
Energy geopolitics plays a significant role within the development and geopolitical strategy of
Russia. Ministry of International Affairs of Russia defines energy diplomacy as activities of state
agencies in collaboration with national companies to protect national interests13. Framing energy
diplomacy in such concept derives from Putin's policy of “national champions” (Forbes 2014). He
suggested this idea in his PhD work (Putin 1997). According to this concept huge corporations in
strategic areas of the economy must not only focus on profit-making, but on providing national
interests  (Putin  1997).  Striking  examples  of  such  corporation  are  “Gazprom”,  “Novatek”,
“Rosneft”, which share 73,1%, 12,6%, and 5% of Russian gas production respectively (Mitrova
2014).
This concept of “national champions” is dictated by the fact that energy supply is the main
source of Russian geopolitical and economic influence in regional and global levels. The “national
champions” is from another point, the integration tool for Russia into the world market and in the
post-soviet  area  (Mitrova  2014).  So,  the  logical  priority  of  Russian  diplomacy  is  to  support
implementation  of  big  energy projects.  At  the  same time,  this  policy  is  criticized  for  its  one-
sidedness,  i.e.  that  economic  development  is  solely driven by one  sector.  Thereby the  Russian
international politics, has to most of times, just adapt to export needs of the energy sector (Russian
International Affairs Council, 2012).
In conclusion of this Chapter, the general features of Russian geopolitics since the dawn of its
statehood could  be  described as  the  following.  In internal  policy:  preservation  of  authoritarian
13 Russian Foreign Ministry. Accessed 1 June 2015. <http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-
dipecon.nsf/466c59993f439bf843256a0c003fb8c4/8bc9fec539eaca72c32570bd002c1684!OpenDocument>
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regimes,  as  the  only possibilities  for  consolidation  and survival  of  Russian  nation.  In  external
policy: providing more or less aggressive policies depending on existing resources and possibilities
of opponent states. Within this picture only energy (gas) geopolitics could be used on a regular basis
as a real tool besides military force. But the enlargement of energy corporations to provide more
focused and manageable politics  has  a  significant  side-effect.  Huge corporations  with financial
resources and political power are using their capabilities to create more favorable conditions for
operations, both within the state and beyond its borders and that can at times mean they have other
(business) interests than Russian geopolitical ambitions.        
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Chapter 5. Geopolitics of the US
This chapter covers the geopolitical concept of the US, in relation with energy geopolitics and
geopolitical relations with Russia. It is impossible to avoid the US influence on a global level and
especially  in  energy geopolitics.  The chapter  attempts  to  answer  the  first  part  of  my Working
Question 2: How can we understand the US geopolitical concept and how does it relate to the
Russian geopolitical concept? Some topics mentioned in this chapter may overlap with topics in
other chapters, but the main aim here is to show the US view of geopolitical processes and how they
relate to the Russian idea of geopolitics.
5.1 General US geopolitics
After the collapse of the USSR and the Socialist Block the US became the only superpower that
remained in global politics. It took advantage of this situation and spread its influence all over the
world. One could argue that the current logical continuation of the US policy is to preserve the
unipolar world and existing status-quo in international relations. To achieve this aim, the US has to
protect the basis of its global domination. On the ground level, it includes lots of aspects such as a
strong economy,  technological achievements,  educated and healthy population,  military powers,
global cultural influence and etc. As one of the results of development in mentioned areas the US
became a dominant power in all oceans of the world, namely the US controls over the global sea-
lanes (Friedman 2015). 
Potentially only two regions in the world could challenge the naval-power of the US: it is South
America and Eurasia.  These regions geographically have a good position to develop the naval-
power. But currently there is no unique, strong state that could consolidate its neighborhood in
South America or Eurasia. The US tries to keep this situation in both of these continents. Towards
the  American  continent  the  US  applied  the  Monroe  Doctrine  (1823)14,  to  ensure  its  unique
hegemony in this region (Stratfor 2011). In relation to Eurasia the situation is more complicated.
The US has to consider that it could not occupy Eurasia, demographically it is in a much weaker
position, but the US has to prevent Eurasia from consolidation and to keep Eurasia divided by
hostile regions or countries against each other (Friedman 2015). 
Practically  it  means  support  of  different  and rival  political  powers  at  the  same time.  This
support  includes  political,  economic,  military  aid  and  providing  American  advisers  to  develop
14 The Monroe Doctrine was articulated in President James Monroe's seventh annual message to Congress on 
December 2, 1823. The European powers, according to Monroe, were obligated to respect the Western Hemisphere 
as the United States' sphere of interest. Source: The Our Documents. Accessed 1 June 2015. 
<http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=23>
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particular capacities. For example, during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) the Reagan administration
supported  both  sides.  In  extreme  cases,  the  US  intervenes  into  Eurasia,  but  not  to  destroy
completely the strongest political group rather to change the balance of powers within the continent.
The examples are military operations in Vietnam (1965-1973) against spreading of communism in
South-East Asia, Afghanistan (since 2001) against Taliban15 movement (Friedman 2015).  
The other policy toward Eurasia is the creation of allies. In this case the US global policy acts
differently in various countries depending on the priority of the country. In practice the US builds its
relations not with the whole the EU, but with separate countries (Friedman 2015). This reflects the
policy to prevent crystallization of a unique power in Eurasia.   
A relatively new battle field related to the US geopolitics within Eurasia is relations with post-
soviet countries. To ensure direct influence in this region the US puts “vassal” governments in some
of these countries. For example, the presidents of the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia)
are  ex-Canada  (V.  Vike-Freiberga)  and  ex-US  (V.  Adamkus  and  T.  Ilves)  citizens.  The  other
example is Georgian and Ukrainian “color revolution” cases. The leader of revolution in Tbilisi
(Georgia) M. Saakashvili received fellowship from the US State Department and the spouse of Kiev
(Ukraine)  leader,  V.  Yushchenko,  is  a  former  US  State  Department  official.  Currently,  in  the
Ukrainian crises (2013-2015) citizens of other countries hold key positions in the government. For
example,  the minister of finance N. Jaresko is a US citizen and the minister of economics  A.
Abromavicius is a Lithuanian citizen (Kibalchich 2015). 
5.2 Energy geopolitics of the US
The start of the US global energy geopolitics was initiated with the “Quincy pact” between the
US (F. Roosevelt) and Saudi Arabia (King Ibn Saud) in 1945. Military protection was provided to
the kingdom in exchange for oil (Cordon 2008).
The modern energy policy of the US is rooted in the Carter Doctrine from 1980. The main goal
of it is to protect the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf (Looney 2012:34). Currently this doctrine is
extended to the Caspian Sea region and Africa. The examples of implementation of Carter Doctrine
are military interventions in 1990-1991 when Iraq occupied Kuwait (G. H. W. Bush), then the US
invasion in Iraq in 2003 (G. W. Bush), and current position of B. Obama to retain an offshore
position in the Persian Gulf (Klare 2012). 
As was mentioned earlier, the Persian Gulf is not the only focus of the US external energy
policy. Caspian Sea basin, Central Asia, and West Africa are also considered as alternative for oil
15 According to Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Taliban is a fundamentalist Islamic militia in Afghanistan. Accessed 1 
June 2015. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/taliban>
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and gas  supplies.  To achieve  diversified  global  energy roads  the  US advocate  development  of
projects in new regions. Additionally, to create closer connections with new sources of energy the
US uses the military rapprochement policy that was applied in the Persian Gulf (Looney 2012:35). 
Currently,  the  US  is  changing  its  energy policy.  The  main  reason  is  technologically  new
innovations in the shale oil and shale gas industry. Therefore,  the US advocates development of
LNG terminals in Europe and East Asia to create open markets for its gas. This policy challenge
traditional energy exporter like Russia and Saudi Arabia.  For example,  pipeline from Russia to
China will be finished in 2018, the same time when the US LNG terminals will be ready to sell
shale gas to the world (Luft 2014). At the same time Saudi Arabia and other Middle East producers
dump the price for oil to make exploitation of the US oil and gas inefficient (Lazarev 2015). 
This struggle might have positive effects for energy consumers. Policy to create pipelines from
Russia to South-East Asia, and at the same time construction of LNG terminals in Europe could
result in energy price fall for Asian countries and the same time reductions of Europe's dependency
on Russia. But, most of resource-rich regions are politically unstable and the final scenario could be
very different.
One of the cases that the US energy policy has to  consider  is  the current  situation on the
Arabian  Peninsula.  The  civil  war  that  started  in  Yemen  (2014)  between  Shia  community  and
government forces led to the military involvement of Saudi Arabia. The situation is complicated by
the fact Iran, that is mostly Shia country, stand on the side of the rebels. If the conflict escalates and
Iran  will start a war with Saudi Arabia, prices for oil will sky-rock (Baranov 2015). 
The other  important  case is  the  framework agreement  with Iran about  its  nuclear  program
(April 2, 2015). This solution will provide development of Iranian nuclear powers and at the same
time Western countries promised to withdraw economic sanctions from Iran. As Iran has one of the
biggest oil and gas reserves in the world and if it will be able to enter the global energy market it
will change market conditions dramatically (Shumilin 2015).
But, in any trend of development of the energy market and even if the US becomes completely
independent from energy imports it will not become independent from global economic relations.
Therefore, the US has to continue the policy of protection of energy flows on a world scale (Hess
2014). 
5.3 Relationship with Russian geopolitics
5.3.1 Characteristic
Diplomatic connections between the US and Russia started in the 18th century. Since then both
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countries have gone through series of rapprochements and deterioration of relations16. For example,
after 09/11 terrorist attack positions of Moscow and Washington became very close and analytics
viewed it as the new level of good relationship between these states (Suslov 2011). But resent crisis
in Ukraine, annexation of Crimea by Russia, and following the US sanction policy against Russia
destroyed positive tendencies in US-Russian relations. Some analytics evaluate the current situation
as a new Cold War (Legvold 2014). Mentioning in National Security Strategy (February 2015)
“Russian aggression in Ukraine” in par with “rise of ISIL within the Syrian civil war” as security
threats to the US clearly describe the level of tension between the US and Russia today (National
Security Strategy 2015:19).
Current tensions between Russia and the US is grounded in different understandings of the
place of Russia in global politics. The US and many other Western countries do not understand why
Russia does not reduce its ambitions and with collaboration of developed countries focus on internal
development, especially in economic and technical aspects. Examples of such option are Germany
and Japan after WWII. At the same time Moscow does not understand why it does not have the
same weight in international relations like the US or China. This misunderstanding is based on the
notion that Moscow did not lose in war in contrast to Berlin or Tokyo (Voloshin 2014).
The other important aspect in the US-Russia relations is that the US, unlike Europe, do not
consider Russia to be part of Europe. So, the primary interest of the US is to resist an alliance
between  technically  advanced  and  capital  rich  Europe  and  resource  rich  Russia  (particularly
between Germany and Russia). This policy could be seen during both World Wars, and the Cold
War (Friedman 2015). 
In practice, this strategy is implemented according current level of the strength of Russia. After
the collapse of the USSR, Russia retains its powers in 3 basis areas. It is: military power, position in
international institutions, and position of a huge energy supplier. In all these areas Washington tries
to mitigate the strength of Moscow.
5.3.2 Military
Current military power of Russia is weaker than the military power of the USSR. At the same
time old allies are trying to get rid of the military presence of Russia in their territory. For example,
closing  of  the  military  station  in  Lourdes  (Cuba)  in  2001  (Solyanskaya  2012)  or  moving  out
Russian bases from Georgia in 2007 (PRAYM 2007). But Russia still keeps a military presence in
16 Source: Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs. Accessed 1 June 2015. 
<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/200years/c30272.htm>
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its neighborhood. For example, in Europe (Transnistria (disputed territory of Moldova), Kaliningrad
region  (Russian  enclave))  and  in  post-soviet  region  (Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia  (disputed
territories of Georgia), Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) (Kommersant Vlast
2003).
In  response,  the  US  builds  “cordon  sanitaire”  around  Russia  (Friedman  2015).  The  US17
develops a network of military bases near Russian borders, particularly in Eastern Europe (Rozoff
2009) and Central Asia (Beehner 2005). Also the US creates bilateral military cooperation with
Caspian Region states, such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, through military aid under
the  Foreign  Military  Financing,  Counterterrorism  Fellowship  Program  and  the  International
Military Education and Training programs (Frappi 2014:193).  
The political  aspect  of  this  plan is  “color  revolutions” in  post-soviet  regions  that  focus  on
democratization and liberalization of states which share borders with Russia. Change of previous
governments in these states that were pro-Russian or neutral to pro-Western or sometimes openly
anti-Russian governments is  the result  of consistent US policy to  isolate Russia.  The rate  with
which “color revolutions” spread (Ukraine (2003), Georgia (2004), Kyrgyzstan (2005)) is a major
concern  of  Russian  both  externally  and  internally.  Russia  is  afraid  of  such  revolutions  in  its
neighboring states because they can affect Russia  itself  and as one of the results  could further
decentralize Russian Federation (Security Council of Russian Federation 2015).
5.3.3 Missile Defense System
One of the main military treats for Russia is the US Missile Defense System (MDS). Basically,
this system does not have offensive capacity and is designed to protect, but Russia sees it as a direct
threat to its security, because theoretically this system could make the military potential of Russia
useless. So nuclear parity of bipolar world will be destroyed. 
In order to legally ground the development of MDS the US in 2002 withdrew from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 (Boese 2002). Further the US started to locate these systems in
Europe (Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Turkey, UK18). To justify this action
the US created an information campaign to show that the aim of MDS is to defend against Iran and
North Korea (The Telegraph 2013). In order to influence this process V. Putin proposed G. Bush to
joint use of radar station in Gabalah (Azerbaijan) and in Armavir (Russia). But these proposals were
rejected (Kramer 2007). 
Russian response was so called “asymmetric response” (Putin 2007). This means creation of
17 The US military presence in different regions are under NATO command or direct US command.
18 Source: US Missile Defense Agency. Accessed 1 June 2015. 
<http://www.mda.mil/system/international_cooperation.html> 
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weapon that will be able to overcome MDS and strike the target. After Russia failed in military
training to launch missiles in 2004, the Russian government has allocated 22 trillion rubles ($720
billion19) till 2020 for military purposes (Litovkin 2014). In 2007 Russia withdrew from the Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and in 2012 start to locate missile systems equipped with
ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad region (Khimshiashvili 2012; INTERFAX.RU 2012; Knap 2012).
5.3.4 NATO
NATO as a military alliance considered by Russia as another treat for its military power and
security.  The main issue is  not the existence of NATO as an organization,  but its  expansion in
Russian border states. After the collapse of the USSR not only old Soviet allies (Poland) but post-
soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) became members of NATO20.
Before  2008  Russia  resisted  NATO expansion  on  a  diplomatic  level.  But  after  the  NATO
summit  in  Bucharest  in  April  2008  where  Georgia  and  Ukraine  were  considered  as  potential
candidates to become members Russia changed its approach (Mearsheimer 2014).
In Georgia, Russia used its military forces to “protect” South Ossetia and Abkhazia (August
2008). Some analytics describe it as attempt of Russia to dramatically reduce the level of influence
of the US in Caucasus by demonstrating that the US security guarantees could not be fulfilled in
this region (Friedman 2015). 
Ukraine takes a more cautious position after the war in Georgia. But with the overturn of pro-
Russian V. Yanukovich in 2013 the new government in Kiev revealed its strong Western orientation.
This open perspective of more dynamic movement towards the EU and NATO, which in the case of
Ukraine considered by Russia as a direct treat for national security. So using the situation in the
eastern part of the Ukraine, where the Russian speaking population was against Western influence,
Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014 (Газета. Ru 2014).  In response, “on 1 April 2014 NATO
foreign ministers decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia”21.
5.3.5 Position in international institutions
The other cornerstone of Russian power is its position in international institutions. The most
important are memberships in UN Security Council (veto power), OSCE, Council of Europe, G8,
BRICS.
On this level Russia diplomacy faces the US diplomatic influence that results in decisions that
19 At the exchange rate in 2010 (BBC 2010). 
20 Source: NATO Member Countries in 2014. Accessed 1 June 2015. 
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm>
21 Source: NATO’s relations with Ukraine. Accessed 1 June 2015. 
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_37750.htm?selectedLocale=en>
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are unfavorable to Russia. For example, resolution of UN General Assembly (27 March 2014) about
territorial  integrity of Ukraine and consideration of the referendum in Crimea (16 March 2014)
about  its  integration  into  Russian  Federation  invalid  (UN  resolution  A/RES/68/262  2014),
suspension of Russia from its right to vote at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE) because of Ukrainian crisis (Euronews 2015), refusal of all G8 countries (except Russia) to
participate in summit in Sochi (that was planned in June 2014) (Лента.Ру 2014) and, moreover,
Russia was not invited to G7 summits in Brussels (4-5 June 2014) and in Germany (7 and 8 June
2015)22.  
Also Russia actively operates at regional level. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
Collective  Security  Treaty  Organization  (CSTO),  and  the  Eurasian  Economic  Community
(EurAsEC) are examples of Moscow-designed projects in post-soviet region.   
The US responded to the regional  project  of Russia  with alternative regional  projects.  For
example, the  New Silk Road initiative proposes to “open new markets connecting Afghanistan to
Central Asia, Pakistan, India and beyond” (US Department of State 2015). The other case is GUAM
organization that was established in 1997 by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Supported
by Clinton Administration the key aim was to support cooperation alternative to Russian leading
projects.  Basically GUAM provide  ground for  the  promotion  of  the  US policy in  the  Caspian
Region (Frappi 2014:190). 
5.3.6 Energy23
The US policy takes into account that Russian state budget is based on energy revenues, and
this is the key element of stability of the Russian government system. The US strategy to influence
energy power of Russia cover activities both within Russia and in its neighborhood.
Foreign participation in the energy sector is limited in Russia by legislation (Mitrova 2014:31)
but  big  US  and  other  Western  oil  companies  are  involved  in  exploration  of  Russian  energy
resources.  Technological gap and depletion of old energy fields force Russia to cooperate  with
them. Using these weaknesses the US potentially could hurt Russia, but at the same time the effect
will hurt its allies because Western countries need stable energy market (Carroll et al 2014).   
To weaken the position of Russia in the energy market the US actively advocates pipeline
22 Source: The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government of Germany. Accessed 1 June 2015. 
<https://www.g7germany.de/Content/EN/StatischeSeiten/G7_elmau_en/texte_en/2014-10-08-ankuendigung-gipfel-
elmau_en.html>
23 The US imports only 4% of its gross imports of petroleum from Russia. Source: U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). Accessed 1 June 2015. <http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=727&t=6>
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projects  to  bypass  Russia  (Hess  2014).  Even  if  these  projects  are  economically  unprofitable
Washington insist on creation independent infrastructure from Caspian Region and Central Asia to
Europe and to Asia.
Reaction of Russia is critical because these territories were once part of the USSR and Russia
traditionally  feel  itself  dominant  power  here.  Geopolitical  activities  of  Russia  here  include
diplomacy and military instruments, similar to the US or China. Regarding to post-soviet countries,
Russia acts through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and fortifies its influence
with military aid,  maintaining of existing military basis,  and military exercises  with the armed
forces of local states (Looney 2012:38).  
In pipeline battle Russian position was undermined in some cases, but the overall situation is
still  in  favor of Moscow. Despite  the loss of the battle  of Baku-Tbilisi-Cheyhan (BTC),  Baku-
Tbilisi-Ersurum (BTE)24 transport of Caspian and especially Central Asian energy to Europe still
concentrated in the hands of Russia.
The most resent possibility to put pressure on the Russian energy position is shale revolution.
Trying to ensure energy imports the US heavily invested in the construction of LNG facilities all
over the world (Katar, Mexican Gulf). After 2010 with its own supply of shale gas level of import
reduced dramatically. But the developed LNG system was ready to function, and it finds its market
in Europe, the main market of Russian gas (LeVine 2014). 
5.4 Securitisation issues
The US the global superpower and its ambitions go far beyond the American continent. At the
same time, the US is not directly an authoritarian country, as it has liberal and democratic roots and
civil society as well as business organizations plays a significant role in decision making processes.
Therefore, to obtain a frame for extraordinary political rights to operate both domestically and in
international level the US government needs a wider security framework. After the collapse of the
USSR the issues of democracy and human rights were adopted as main statements of external
policy. With the declaration of a ‘war on terror’ in the slipstream of 9/11, followed up by invasions
in Afghanistan,  Iraq and the present bombings of Islamic state (ISIS) national security became
securitized  to  an  extreme  degree.  Currently,  the  spread  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  and
terrorism were added to the international policy semantics of the US. Practical applications of the
US securitization policy are efforts to control the international relations on a global level. It means
the creation of allies in different parts of the world, hereunder Russia when needed, for example in
24 BTC transport oil with transit route Kasakhstan-Aserbaijan-Georgia-Turkey, BTE transport natural gas by transit 
route Aserbaijan-Georgia-Turkey. Source: US Energy Information Administration. Accessed 1 June 2015. 
<http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=CSR>
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the fight  against  ‘terror’,  provide subordinated position for  allies,  and create  distortions in  key
regions  and  countries  that  resist  expanding  influence  of  the  US.  US  policies  related  to
securitarization therefore have many internal and external audiences. 
5.5 Summary
The US, despite the reduction of its influence still keeps the leading position in international
relations. American economy, technological advance, military power, access to natural resources are
key elements of the US hegemony in the world.
This  hegemony is  the  origin  of  tensions  with  Russia,  that  used  to  hold  an  equal  position.
Russian diplomacy often shows demonstrative acts opposite to the US external policy. For example,
in  cases  of  Kosovo,  Transnistria  (disputed  territory  of  Moldova),  South  Ossetia  and  Abkhazia
(disputed territory of Georgia), or in relation to the events of the Arab Spring.  
Despite existing problems the US and Russia understand that they are also treated by common
issues, such as terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Facing such situations US-
Russian relations become very effective and productive, as in case of the solution of the Iranian
nuclear question.
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Chapter 6. Geopolitics of Europe
This  chapter  covers  issues  of  geopolitics  of  the  EU.  The  main  problem  for  centralizing
processes  in  Europe  is  that  the  EU  member  states  are  in  the  process  of  forming  a  general
geopolitical  strategy  that  covers  all  the  aspects  of  international  relations,  including  energy
geopolitics that is still the individual responsibility of states. Despite these challenges the aim of this
project   is  to  cover  the geopolitical  activities of the EU as a  union, also its  energy issues and
relations with Russia both as a union and at the level of separate states. The chapter attempts to
answer the second part of  my Working Question 2: How can we understand the EU geopolitical
concept  and  how does  it  relate  to  the  Russian  geopolitical  concept?  The  chapter  includes  the
following parts: the general geopolitics of Europe, the energy geopolitics of Europe, in particular
relations  with Russian geopolitics  that  include:  a  general  overview of  relationships,  the  energy
relationship, energy conflicts (gas wars) and the European response.
6.1. General geopolitics of Europe
European  geopolitics  can  be  categorized  as  falling  into  two  areas.  Internal  geopolitics  is
focused on the  consolidation  of  member  states  into  a  unique  geopolitical  entity.  Primarily  this
means the formation of single domestic and foreign the EU policies. External geopolitics is focused
on providing a good international environment for the EU to ensure the security of the Union25. 
This goal is achieved by the expansion of the EU as geopolitical entity and an increase of its
influence on a global level. These processes could be represented by a concentric circle model, with
its center in Brussels. Circles are expanding with the process of accepting of certain conditions by
periphery states (Aalto 2008:45). 
Expansion  of  the  EU  circle  model  is  performed  by the  strategy  of  region  building.  This
geopolitical  approach is  used  to  create  new economic  architectures,  to  disperse  European core
beliefs and values, and to provide Europeanization (Bialasiewicz 2012:41). 
The  main  feature  of  Europeanization  is  nonmilitary policy (Orbie  2008:6).  Refusal  to  use
military instruments is compensated mainly by the use of soft power26 and economic power. Europe
extends soft power frames and they become the center of civilian power (Bialasiewicz 2012:6). This
broad  policy  is  achieved  through  development  aid,  market  access,  political  dialog,  and  other
activities in international affairs (Orbie 2008:13, 162). 
25 Source: The founding principles of the Union. Accessed 2 June 2015. 
<http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/objectives_en.htm#OBJECTIVES>
26 Soft power is political power to obtain goals by means of the attractiveness of culture, political ideals and 
democracy (Quemada et al 2011:237).
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European economic policy is tightly bound with political values and concepts, primarily liberal
democracy and human rights. The practical political instrument of the EU's economic power is the
trade.  European trade power is  based on a  large market  and on the international  trade system,
because, together with the US, it has heavily impacted on the design of the WTO (World Trade
Organization).  In addition to the EU policy to expand the European values beyond the region,
companies  in  non-EU countries  pressure their  governments  to  update  legislation  and standards
according to the EU norms in order to have access to the lucrative market (Orbie 2008:35-37, 44,
208). So, Europe has a serious capacity to establish and export norms (Laidi 2008). 
By combining  various  influence  mechanisms  the  EU becomes  a  transforming  power.  This
opens  possibilities  to  change state  behavior  to  the  European pattern  and,  moreover,  to  modify
government systems within countries (Quemada et al 2011:242). 
Enlargement  Policy  and  European  Neighborhood  Policy  (ENP)  are  examples  of
Europeanization  strategy.  If  the  Enlargement  Policy  is  more  focused  on  the  transformation  of
member  and  candidate  member  states,  according  to  European  standards,  the  aim  of  the
Neighborhood Policy is to provide presence and influence in the EU's vicinity. Through this policy
the EU could prioritize specific countries, for example resource rich or transit countries, and use
conditional instruments, such as political dialog, access to markets or financial support, to achieve
European geopolitical goals (Orbie 2008:217, 228, 239). Less powerful tools of the Neighborhood
Policy are training programs for civil servants, cooperation with institutions, think-tanks, and joint
research programs, such as studies focused on the energy aspects of common interest (Quemada et
al 2011:241).
It should be mentioned that the EU has equal and interdependent relations with the US and
other developed countries.  However,  Europe applies a “neocolonial”  policy towards developing
countries.  Basically, this means a strong dependency relationship with the third world. The other
feature of the EU policy in developing countries is security. Securitisation concept is on the basis of
European development policy. Aid is used to address security issues of the EU, along with the fight
against poverty in developing countries as stated in official documents. In practice, securitisation  is
achieved  through financial flows that are directed to strategically important countries, primarily
those close to Europe (Orbie 2008:6, 82). 
6.2. Energy geopolitics of Europe
The main characteristic of the EU’s energy policy is that energy security is an issue of national
policy of each member state (Orbie 2008:205). So there is neither a common European energy
policy, nor a common model to develop member states’ energy policies (Quemada et al 2011:254).
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The main reasons are significant differences between member states in levels of domestic energy
resources and existing energy requirements, and the operation of separate national energy industries
(Biresselioglu 2011:32). 
The other  issue is  that  the  EU is  heavily dependent  on its  external  energy sources27.  This
situation is complicated by the fact that other world powers also have interests in resource rich
regions. Russia has interests in the post-soviet areas and the US in the Middle East. So, for example,
the EU has limited access in Persian Gulf reserves because of the political and military presence and
influence of the US and, moreover, existing relations of Europe are framed by the US’s external
policy towards this region (Orbie 2008:209, 233). So, the EU is vulnerable to political speculations
with energy supplies.
6.3. Relations with Russian geopolitics
6.3.1 Characteristic
The long term and successful  development  of  the  EU as  a  world power could slowly but
steadily involve Russian integration. By fulfilling certain conditions, the process of Europeanization
of Russia will result in the creation of a European political space with its center in Brussels (Aalto
2008:45), in “big Europe” from Lisbon to Vladivostok (Rar 2014). But this hardly seems realistic. 
In reality EU-Russia relations are pragmatic. Russia does not want multilevel integration in the
EU, but at the same time needs cooperation with it. The EU, on the other hand, understands the
limits of its influence on Russian development, and concentrates on particular topics of partnership
(Zagorski 2004:86). 
Failure  of  the  integration  processes  of  historically  and  geographically  close  neighbors  has
various  reasons.  For example,  Russia  had territorial  disputes  with some the EU member states
(Latvia and Estonia) (pravda.ru 2005; Sheeter 2007). Recent Russian policy to unite the russkiy mir,
declared by V. Putin (Socor 2014) could potentially threaten East European countries that have
Russian communities (Bender 2014). Also Moscow has military forces within Europe (Transnistria
(disputed  territory  of  Moldova),  and  Kaliningrad  region  (Russian  enclave)).  Russia  refused  to
participate in the ENP28 and emphasized its special position and equal power status with the EU. At
the same time the different politics pursued by the EU member states towards Russia, political
27 12,637,000 barrels of oil per day in 2013; 4,188 million cubic meter of natural gas in 2013. Source: The Statistics 
Portal. Accessed 2 June 2015. <http://www.statista.com/statistics/265303/oil-imports-into-europe/>
28 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a framework proposed to the 16 of EU's neighbours (Algeria, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia 
and Ukraine). The ENP is chiefly a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country. It is further enriched 
and complemented by regional and multilateral co-operation initiatives. Source: European External Action Service. 
Accessed 2 June 2015. <http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm> 
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issues (status of Kosovo, human rights) and problems of energy supply are additional reasons for
“permanent” misunderstanding (Orbie 2008:221).  
6.3.2 Energy relationship
Energy policy is the basis of current EU-Russian relations, because Europe is dependent on
Russian energy resources and Russia is dependent on the European energy market (Cohen 2007).
Russian external energy politics serve its national interest and aims to promote the best environment
for its supplies. Because there is no common energy policy in the EU, Russia uses this advantage
and prefers to sign bilateral agreements with European countries (German, France, Italy, Hungary)
(Marquina 2008:30). 
Europe has so far been rather unsuccessful in its attempts to frame energy relations with Russia
via the Energy Charter29. Russia did not want to open its energy sector to the free market, especially
not providing access to its pipeline system. The concept of a ‘strong state’ and the ideology of
“sovereign democracy” justify nationalization of strategic economic sectors (Marquina 2008:28).
On the other hand, energy is an instrument of Russian foreign policy, so for its effective usage in
international relations it has to be controlled by state companies directly influenced by the Kremlin
(Marquina 2008:xvi).  For  example,  the  biggest  Russian energy company,  “Gazprom”,  is  called
“Russia's ministry of foreign affairs for the 21st century” (Aalto 2008:184).
6.3.3 Gas wars
Extreme cases of application of Russian gas power are interruptions of gas supply. It should be
mentioned that from 1973, when gas was first exported to Europe, until 1992, when Ukraine first
interrupted supplies, the USSR had never used the gas supply as a weapon. The obvious conclusion
from this fact is that the Soviets were cautious about their international reputation. Since the 1990s
periodic cuts  in  supply,  mainly to  CIS countries,  were because they could not  pay the bills  or
siphoned extra gas during transit. From a business perspective Russia used its right to demand the
full price (Victor et al 2006:163). 
With the increase in energy revenues after the 2000th (McMahon 2015) Russia has become more
aggressive in its energy politics. Russia got involved in crises with both of its transit countries,
Ukraine and Belarus (Kirby 2014; IHS 2007). After the “Orange revolution” in the Ukraine in 2004,
and its switch to the European direction of external policy, gas prices increased and caused a supply
29 Energy Charter is the result of a political initiative launched in Europe in the early 1990s.  The Energy Charter 
Treaty is as part of an international effort to build a legal foundation for energy security. The fundamental aim of the
Energy Charter Treaty is to strengthen the rule of law on energy issues, by creating a level playing field of rules to 
be observed by all participating governments, thereby mitigating risks associated with energy-related investment and
trade. Source: Energy Charter. Accessed 2 June 2015.  <http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=7>
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crisis in 2005-2006 (Victor et al 2006:337). It should be mentioned that during the V. Yanukovich
(pro-Russian) presidency in the Ukraine (2010-2014) Russia gave a 30% discount on gas for the
Ukraine (from $400 to $268,5 per 1,000 cubic metres) (news.bigmir.net 2013), but with the change
of government in 2013 (anti-Russian) the gas price was raised from $268,5 to $485 per 1,000 cubic
metres (Kirby 2014).   
To overcome ambitions of transit states30 and to access the European energy market directly,
Russia initiated the construction of an expensive pipeline system. The main pipelines are: “Nord
Stream”, direct gas pipeline between Russia and Germany across the Baltic Sea (exploitation for the
first string started in 2011, and the second in 2012 (Mitrova 2014:34)); “Blue Stream”, a direct gas
pipeline between Russia  and Turkey across  the  Black Sea  (exploitation started  in  200231). The
“Turkish Stream” was originally conceived of as the “South Stream” but changed the direction from
Bulgaria to Turkey in December 2014. The official reason for the cancellation was the failure of
Bulgaria  and  the  European  Commission  to  provide  guarantees  that  the  pipelines  could  be
constructed and gas would be allowed to flow through them (Stern et al 2015:5). 
6.3.4 Europe's response
From  the  very  first  interruption  of  the  gas  supply  Europe  understood  the  level  of  its
vulnerability. Its reaction was to create new pipelines and terminals to overcome dependency on
Russia. These projects were a first reaction and a more expensive solution than continuing to be
super dependent on Russian gas. For example, Poland signed deals with Norway at prices that were
about 20% higher than Russia's. None of those supplies have been delivered, but the diversification
question served to frighten Russia as the low cost supplier. The other example is that Germany
interconnected with the rest of the western market to mitigate transit risks (Victor et al 2006:163). 
Despite the fact the Europe lacked energy resources, it could benefit from its attractive market.
In  the  long  run,  with  appropriate  politics,  an  alternative  supplier  willing  to  access  it  (Aalto
2008:57). The basis of such policy could be the expansion of production capacity by supplier states
(Banks 2007:203).   
To be able to meet European energy market requirements Russia desperately needs Central
Asian gas reserves.  Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where Russia is a major investor in
the gas industry since 2003, have a key position in Russia’s plan to build a unified gas system in
Central Asia. Therefore, Russia can force these countries, that are land locked without access to
30 Russia has 8 pipelines that goes through Ukraine with total capacity of 143 bcm (Bcm – billion cubic metres), and 2 
pipelines through Belarus with total capacty of 35 bcm (Mitrova 2014:99).
31 Source: “Gazprom” web-page. Accessed 2 June 2015.  
<http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/blue-stream/>
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European  markets,  to  use  the  Russian  pipeline  system  (Victor  et  al  2006:222,  225-226).  For
example,  in  2002  V.  Putin  proposed  a  Eurasian  Gas  Alliance  between  Russia,  Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan,  and  Uzbekistan.  This  project  aimed  at   strengthening  Moscow's  position,  but,
moreover,  it  also  gave   it  the  instruments  it  needs  to  coordinate  regional  energy development
(Penkova 2014:120). 
Europe could use the desire  of these countries to  provide independent  energy and external
policies, especially because the overall situation is not developing in favor of Russian ambitions32.
Examples of the perspective of the EU policies towards these states are Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements  with  Azerbaijan  and  Kazakhstan,  with  the  focus  on  energy cooperation,  technical
assistance  through  TACIS  (Technical  Assistance  to  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States)
program (Ceccorulli 2014:176), and the “Southern strategy” to import gas from the Caspian region
and  Central  Asia  through  pipeline  projects  Trans-Anatolian  natural  gas  pipeline  (TANAP)  and
Nabucco (Ratner et al 2013:1). 
The other alternative to Russian gas is North Africa (Libya, Egypt, and Algeria). The problem
is that Russia's direct competitor in the European gas market – Algeria – is a less reliable supplier
(Victor et al 2006:337). The “Arab Spring” has created massive political distortions in that region
since  2010.  Because  energy  projects  require  huge  investments,  which  in  turn  require  at  least
political stability besides price stability, the prospects of intensive development of energy projects
in North Africa are, it seems, vague.  
Currently, the most likely way to weaken Russian gas hegemony in Europe is the expansion of
LNG imports into the EU (Victor et al 2006:337). Building LNG terminals and the entrance of the
US (and potential the East African new gas fields) into the EU gas market will not only diversify the
European energy flow but also give an advantage in the cost of energy33. 
6.4  Securitisation issues
It is hard to evaluate securitisation issues related to the EU. The main reason for that is that the
EU consists of different countries with different ambitions and potentials. Therefore, Europe from
the security perspective should be viewed as different smaller regions. For example, the Western
Europe, including Great Britain, France, Germany view securitisation quite differently that Eastern
Europe and Baltic countries. Obviously migration is presently an issue that has become securitized
but  to  the  purpose  of  this  thesis,  the  securitisation  of  issues  related  to  Russian  energy transit
32 After the explosion on “Central Asia-Center” pipeline in 2009, Russia do not buy gas from Turkmenistan in volumes
agreed by the long-term contracts. This situation created tensions between governments of Turkmenistan and Russia 
(Russian International Affairs Council 2013:15)
33 In US natural gas market natural gas is not priced against oil (Ratner et al 2013:3).
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countries and the most dependent Russian energy consuming countries will be considered.
The main transit  countries  of Russian oil  and gas are  Ukraine and Belarus.  If  Belarus has
strategically close relations and a stable position towards Moscow, the position of Ukraine is both
fragile and extremely hostile. Kiev view Russia as the main supporter of separate movement in the
east of Ukraine. Therefore, the official positions of Ukraine and state propaganda accuses Russia for
all problems of government, including economic collapse, corruption, huge external debt, and etc. 
The Baltic states and Eastern European countries that have historical ties to Russia experience
political pressure from Moscow along with its manipulation of energy supplies. As in the case of
Ukraine, Russia is viewed as securitisation issue. Therefore, in order to guarantee the security of the
states,  governments  of  these countries  propagate closer  integration with Western countries  and,
particularly, the EU and NATO.      
6.5 Summary
In  the  current  European political  concept  of  a  liberal  world  order,  cooperation  (economic,
political and cultural) plays a major role.  This idea is different from realism or nationalism and has
as its basis the claim that tight interdependence will make any war impossible. But during the Cold
War, Western Europe was a in alliance with the US, had to resist the USSR and the Socialist Block,
which at that point was a superpower and acted according the realist approach. So, Europe and the
US played by the bi-polar rules of engagement this changed with the collapse of the USSR. From
then on liberal democracy as a concept was claimed as the only true concept of world order and was
expanded to the supranational level. First within Europe, then exported to neighboring regions, and
one could argue worldwide. 
But with the crises of the liberal model of development, concepts of nationalism and realism
return  to  frame  politics  in  Europe.  For  example,  the  EU's  approach  to  political  reform,  good
governance and a transition to a market economy largely failed in Central Asian republics. Russia
and China  have  demonstrated  the  weakness  of  the  European policy in  this  region.  Long term
development  plan  of  the  EU,  which  include  social,  political  and  economic  changes  was  not
implemented in  these countries.  But  the policy of conservation of authoritarian regimes in  this
region supported with corrupted financial and energy linkages of Russia and China were successful
and prevent  the initiatives  of democratization and liberalization provided by Europe (Marquina
2008:xix). 
As new players in international relations, like China, become stronger and more influential,
they will, I suggest, use realism in politics rather that liberalism to further its interests. So the rules
of the game change again in favor of realistic approach and Europe will  have to follow them.
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Therefore,  despite  the  fact  that  the  EU regards  itself  as  a  civilian  power  without  any military
ambitions,  Europe has to compete with the US, Russia,  and other rising powers,  which follow
realpolitik (Orbie 2008:234). 
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Chapter 7. Geopolitics of China
This  chapter covers geopolitics of China as an emerging power which rapidly changes  the
shapes of the global geopolitics. From the energy aspect China is a potentially biggest market in the
world  and Russia  eager  to  create  significant  relations  and infrastructure  to  provide  supplies  in
exchange for revenues and development of its own eastern regions. The chapter attempts to answer
the last part of my Working Question 2: How can we understand China’s geopolitical concept and
how does it relate to the Russian geopolitical concept? The aim of this chapter is to reveal the links
between Russian and Chinese geopolitical strategies from the perspective of China, show common
points of interest between them and the overall place of Russia in Chinese geopolitics. The main
topics of this chapter are: geopolitics of China, energy aspects of Chinese geopolitics, and relations
with Russian geopolitics. 
7.1 General geopolitics of China
China has ancient governance traditions, but in 19th and first half of 20th centuries, this state
lived through a period of national humiliation. Its territory has been separated between developed
states into areas of influence, with further occupation of some regions. But after overcoming all
these  issues,  China  was  able  to  consolidate  state  integrity.  With  grows  of  its  power  Chinese
geopolitical interests extended from internal problems to near abroad, and then, to global level. 
Primary  region  of  Chinese  interest  is  Eurasia.  On  the  basis  of  the  “Middle  Kingdom”
philosophy, it creates “China-centric” model of international relations (Dergachev 2014). The main
place  in  this  strategy  is  given  to  “regionalisation”  of  international  relation  and  creation
“communication corridors”. The examples of such policy are the “String of Pearls” strategy34 or
“Blue-Water”35 strategy ( Dergachev 2014).   
The main goal of current Chinese geopolitics is to balance domination of Western countries.
Particularly, diplomatic, political and military actions are taken to mitigate US global hegemony. It
34 Proposed in the early 2000s by US researchers in response to Chinese investment in ports along the Indian Ocean 
littoral, the “string of pearls” theory argued that China may be planning to develop overseas naval bases in South 
Asia to support extended naval deployments (Marantidou 2014:1).
35 In theory, a blue-water navy is a maritime force capable of operating in the deep waters of the open oceans. In 1982, 
Chinese Admiral Liu Huaqing proposed a three stage maritime development plan that came to be accepted as the 
backbone of China’s future maritime strategy. The plan recommended establishment of control over the first island 
chain by 2010; extend its maritime influence to the second island chain by 2020; and establish a force that would 
challenge the US Navy in the Indian and Pacific Oceans by 2050. Until then, Huaqing averred China must avoid an 
unnecessary projection of naval strength. China apparently desires de-facto control over maritime facilities it helps 
build and maintain. China’s maritime strategy, however, is not limited to stealthy control over domestic 
infrastructure in the Indian Ocean and manifests in other ways. Using high-interest infrastructure loans as barter-
chips for strategic concessions in the Indian Ocean is, in fact, an important tool in Beijing’s geopolitical toolkit 
(Singh 2015).
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should be mentioned that China provide its policy both on its own and thought creation of aliens
network  that  include  energy rich  states,  such  as  Russia,  Iran,  Venezuela  (Andrews-Speed  and
Dannreuther 2011:113).  
The logical continuation of Chinese geopolitics was a project of “New Silk Road” announced
by Chinese President Xi Jinping in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek
in 2013 (O'Reilly 2013). This geopolitical project reflects the formula “Who rules the Eurasia, rules
the world”. In practice this mean creation of solid region that include China, Central Asia, Eastern
and  Western  Europe,  with  a  population  of  3  billion  people  and  enormous  internal  market.  In
combination with “Maritime Silk Road”36 and international  economic links “Bangladesh-China-
India-Myanmar”, “China-Pakistan (Baluchistan)”, and “China-Tajikistan-Iran” this policy reveals
ambitions of China to control Eurasia via the power of its economy (Dergachev 2014). 
Chinese  project  has  to  compete  with the  “New Silk  Road” initiative  of  US and “Eurasian
Economic Union”37 project of Russia. The characteristics of US strategy is an effort to democratize
the  regions,  including  Central  Asia,  South  Asia,  South  Caucasus,  and  Mongolia.  The  Russian
project in its turn reveals plans of Moscow to unite post-soviet republics under its control. The
Russian strategy basically focused on diminishing Western influence in Eastern Europe and Central
Asia and persuasion of post-soviet countries to join the Union (Dergachev 2014).
Chinese project has much more realistic basis under it. The main argument is the economic
power of China. Its GDP and annual foreign investment value are enormous (GDP $9.240 trillion
201338). One of the disadvantages of Russian and US projects is their scale. In demographic aspect
they are much smaller. The other disadvantage is ideology. In contrast to US that bet on neo-liberal
globalization, China puts an effort on economic relations in specific regions. From the other hand
Russia  does  not  focus  on  economic  and  technological  development.  It  exports  mainly  energy
resources and could not compete with Chinese production. One of the specific feature of China's
projects is the non-political character of integration. To be part of this project countries do not have
to fulfill any political conditions (Dergachev 2014).
7.2 Energy geopolitics of China
“The country (China) was a net oil  exporter  until  the early 1990s and became the world's
36 Maritime Silk Road – the concept  proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, that is aimed at enhancing 
maritime partnership against the backdrop that China's geopolitical ties with its Southeast Asian neighbors brings 
both opportunities for cooperation and challenges from territorial disputes (Jiao and Yunbi 2013).
37 The Eurasian Economic Union is an international organization for regional economic integration. The Member-
States of the Eurasian Economic Union are the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. Source: The Eurasian Economic Union. Accessed 1 June 2015. 
<http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=en#about>
38 Source: The World Bank. Accessed 1 June 2015. <http://data.worldbank.org/country/china>
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second-largest net importer of crude oil  and petroleum products in 2009”39.  In 2014 China had
imported approximately 6 million barrels per day40. This shows the huge dependence of China on
the international oil market.
Within China approach to this problem is different. Some officials and experts view growing
dependence on foreign energy supplies as a strategic threat. Others see it as a natural process of
growing global interdependence (Looney 2012:403).
Current energy geopolitics of China are expressed in 12th five year plan, adopted in 2011. Here
China  adopts  emerging-energy policy  which  means  developing  of  alternatives  to  coal  and  oil,
particularly renewables, nuclear and natural gas (Yergin 2012:224).
In  the  basis  of  energy  geopolitics  China  grounded  its  main  vulnerabilities  except  total
dependence on energy import. One of the weakest points of Chinese energy is its dependence on
maritime transport of oil supplies from abroad, particularly on the South China Sea and the Straits
of Malacca and Hormuz. Approximately 80% of China's imported oil is delivered by sea. The other
issue is  that  Western companies control  big portion of the world's  highest  quality oil  reserves.
Additionally,  they play a major role in the oil technical services market,  international oil  trade,
investment in oil projects, and poses advanced technology in the energy sectors (Looney 2012:403).
Therefore, to guarantee energy supplies China use long term agreements to strengthen with
active economic and diplomatic links in all potential resource-rich regions (Middle East, Africa, the
Caspian Sea, Central Asia). The other aspect of energy policy is the creation of energy delivery
infrastructure (Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther  2011:70).  For  example,  agreements  for  oil  and
natural  gas  pipelines  from Central  Asian  (Philippens  2011).  Also,  like  the  US,  China  expand
military  connections  with  its  suppliers.  The  example  of  the  militarization  of  Chinese  energy
geopolitics could be seen in Africa and Central Asia (Looney 2012:37).
A byproduct of hyperactive involvement of China in energy rich countries is long term issues
that could threaten China and other states. For example, China is investing in politically uncertain
countries, countries with internal conflicts, with structural problems, such as corruption, big crime
rates, and ineffective governments. Most predictable outcomes of these actions are huge financial
losses (Looney 2012:410). 
From  the  perspective  of  future  energy  development,  two  facts  should  be  taken  into
consideration. Shale oil and shale gas development in the US and Chinese reserves of gas shale (the
largest  in  the world41)  (Luft  2013).  Shale revolution that  started in  North America was able  to
39 Source: The US Energy Information Administration (EIA). Accessed 1 June 2015. 
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ch>
40 Source: The US Energy Information Administration (EIA). Accessed 1 June 2015. 
<http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15531>
41 China has 144,4 tcm shale gas recources, with 36,1 tcm technically recoverable shale gas. It is about 50% higher 
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diversify supply on this continent. In attempt to spread to Europe it faced a number of challenges,
such as, Europe is already connected to the large gas supplier, land ownership issues, and etc. So the
logical destination of shale based investment is Asia. And if shale technologies will start to explore
enormous Chinese  resources  it  will  have a  huge impact  not  only within  China,  but  worldwide
(Brussels Forum 2012).  
7.3 Relationship with Russian geopolitics
Geography has made China and Russia natural allies42. Huge territory, which combined cover
most  of  Eurasia,  large  population,  military  power  (including  nuclear  weapons),  fast  growing
economy with  the  biggest  amount  of  natural  resource  could  be  a  sound basis  of  a  long  term
friendship (Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther 2011:113). China and Russia have common ground in
a number of aspects  of  international  relations  and internal  politics.  The main one is  struggling
against a unipolar world with US leadership and creation of multi-polar global regime (MFA of
Russian Federation 2005). Both of these states are multinational and the question of state integrity is
essential. Therefore, Beijing and Moscow are treating Western policies, such as NATO enlargement,
“color revolutions” (in ex-USSR region), and humanitarian interventions (Kosovo, Iraq), as national
security threats. Both these states developed their own vision of statehood philosophy, such as the
concept of “sovereign democracy” in Russia and the idea of a “harmonious society” in China. These
doctrines claim the distinctive national paths of development and resist  the liberal  paradigm of
democratization (Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther 2011:117). 
In regions where Russia has geopolitical interests China demonstrates that its strategic interests
matches with plans of Moscow. Generally they try to limit Western influence, to destroy Islamic and
secessionist forces, and to support existing regimes from democratization pressure. Particularly in
Central  Asia  Chinese  and Russian  geopolitics  have  similar  goals,  to  ensure that  their  common
strategic region is not controlled by the US (Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther 2011:124, 127).
Russia has been the main beneficiary of financial assistance aspect of energy geopolitics of
China. The number of Chinese loans is astronomic: China National Petrol Corporation (CNPC) lent
to Russian state companies $6 billion as an advance payment for the future deliveries of oil in 2005-
2010, then in 2008 an additional loan of $25 billion in return for a guarantee of completion of a
pipeline to China and import rate of 15 million tonnes of oil per year in 2011 (Andrews-Speed and
Dannreuther 2011:69). It  should be mentioned that facing perspectives of energy collaborations
Russia and China was able to find consensus for their territorial dispute in 2008 (RIA news 2008).
that in US (Gao 2012:16).
42 First international agreement between Russia and China dated the end of XVII century (Kartsev 2014).
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The most  resent  energy agreements was signed in  2014.  This  gas  deal  worth $400 billion and
include construction of the strategic pipeline system (Perlez 2014).
7.5 Securitisation issues
Securitisation  issues  of  China  within  the  domain  of  Russian  energy  geopolitics  could  be
evaluated through the position of China as a growing consumer of energy recourses. In this case, as
was mentioned earlier, Chinese disadvantage is that their main marine energy routes are controlled
by the US. Also China resists the influence of the Western liberal-democratic model and securitize
existing statehood doctrine and policy of China.   
7.5 Summary
Chinese geopolitics is similar to a chess game. World powers could see its figures, trace the
policy that aims to create new ones or strengthen existing. Only future combinations are hidden
from observers. 
The  same  pattern  is  used  in  energy  geopolitics.  Namely,  China  was  able  to  become  an
influential player using three aspects: as a huge customer, as a holder as strategic assets, and as an
investor (Looney 2012:407).
In  relations  with  Russia,  China  still  has  a  significant  level  of  independence  from Russian
supplies unlike Europe. Russia is only China’s fifth largest supplier of oil and provide only 4% of
China’s LNG (Luft 2013). At the same time China was able to become a major player in Central
Asia, where Russia expects traditional dominance. For example, Chinese companies control nearly
one third of Kazakhstan's oil output (Looney 2012:408) and China ended the Russian monopoly on
Turkmenistan's gas export (in 2009) (Placido 2014:211). 
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Chapter 8. Smaller states in geopolitics of Russia 
This  chapter  covers  issues  of  smaller  states  that  border  Russia  and  become  the  object  of
geopolitical games between Russia and other world powers. The main challenge for analysis of
these countries is the fact that they have different foreign policy schemes.  Therefore, each of these
states  tries  to  build  their  own  geopolitical  relationship  with  Russia  and  other  world  powers,
including matters of energy security. Despite these challenges the aim of this chapter is to uncover
potential threats of smaller states that border Russia as the result of Russian geopolitical ambitions
and activities.
The chapter attempts to answer my Working Question 3: How does the Russian geopolitical
idea and its relationship to other world powers influence other, smaller, states? In this chapter the
countries  will  be  grouped  by  regions  and  the  following  issues  will  be  discussed:  the  general
geopolitics of Russia in relation to these countries; the energy geopolitics of Russia in relation to
these countries; and existing conflicts with direct and non-direct participation of Russia in these
countries and potential for future conflicts. This chapter is written on the basis of previous chapters,
therefore, some repetition of facts and issues are impossible. But, here these ideas are viewed from
the position of smaller countries. 
8.1 Eastern Europe
Despite that the EU-Russian relation was discussed in the Chapter 6 the relations of some
Eastern European states with Russia should be evaluated separately in the frames of the Working
question of this chapter. For this purpose I group this region in two parts: the Baltic states plus
Poland; and Belarus with Ukraine. The logic behind this decision is the level of integration of these
states with the EU and level of Russian influence in these countries.
8.1.1 Baltic states and Poland
First of all it should be mentioned that the Baltic states are Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. All
three states were under control of the Russian Empire, then the USSR and obtained independence in
early 1990th. Currently these states are members of the EU and NATO, but Russia has vital interests
in  this  region.  The main strategic  interest  of  Russia  in  Baltic  region is  access  to the sea-lanes
through this region or territory. 
In the history of Poland, the Russian Empire played an essential role in the occupation of the
ancient Polish state. During the USSR era, Poland was in the sphere of Soviet influence and part of
51
the military Warsaw Pact.  Currently,  Poland is  part  of  the EU and NATO and has  active anti-
Russian position (Chafuen 2014).
The main security concern for Russian is the inclusion of these countries in the,  so called,
“cordon sanitaire” around Russia. Therefore, Russia resisted the active integration of these countries
into Europe and Western military organizations.  This  included an expansion of NATO to these
countries43 when Russia claimed that this policy is a security threat to Russia. The other issue for
Russia was the expansion of the EU. In this case Russia claimed that this policy aim to finally
separate Russia from these countries (Nartov 2004).  Currently, Russia is reacting very sensitive to
each attempt of enforcement of NATO powers in these countries.
The other security concern for Russia is growing aggressive nationalism in the Baltic states.
Therefore, from the point of Moscow, the human rights of representatives of the Russian nation, in
these countries are violated (Nartov 2004).    
Russia has different instruments and ways of influencing  the Baltic states and Poland. One of
them is to push existing territorial disputes between Russia and the Baltic states and threaten these
countries. In addition to that, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have a substantial  Russian minority that
Russia publicly argues it  has the right to protect.  Therefore,  Russia could activate its  policy of
russkiy mir and destabilize the political situation in the region. 
The other leverage of pressure is the energy dependence of the Baltic states and Poland on
energy imports44. In 1991 Russia used gas blockade against Estonia and Lithuania when these states
announced the withdrawal from the USSR (Slutskaya 2004).    
The last influence possibility for Russia has is related to the enclave of Kaliningrad, which is a
highly militarized area. Poland and Lithuania share borders with this area and as a response to the
location of the US MDS (Missile Defense System) in Poland or Baltic states Russia reinforces
militarization of Kaliningrad (Chafuen 2014).
8.1.2 Belarus and Ukraine
Both  of  these  countries  were  part  of  the  USSR.  Currently,  they  have  different  vectors  of
international relations. Belarus keeps close relationships with Russia, but Ukraine tries to follow the
European path. 
From  the  position  of  Moscow,  both  of  these  states  are  part  of  the  Russian  nation  and
independence of these countries is seen as an unnatural phenomenon (Slutskaya 2004). From an
43 Russian last military object in Lithuania finished its functions in 1998 (Nartov 2004).
44 Source: Eurostat. Accessed 3 June 2015. <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:Energy_dependency_rate_
%E2%80%94_all_products,_2012_(%25_of_net_imports_in_gross_inland_consumption_and_bunkers,_based_on_t
onnes_of_oil_equivalent)_YB14.png>
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economic point of view, Ukraine and Belarus are main communication lines that link Russia to
Europe, including energy pipelines.
Currently, Russia has annexed the Crimea peninsula, part of Ukrainian territory and actively
supports separatist forces in the South-East Ukraine. The roots of these conflicts should be traced to
the collapse of the USSR.   
One  of  the  oldest  Russian  security  concerns  in  Ukraine  is  the  claim  of  radicalization  of
Ukrainian society and creation of nationalist organizations in Kiev. This was linked to the violation
of the rights of Russians and Russian speaking population in Ukraine, especially in the Crimea and
the South-East Ukraine (Nartov 2004).    
The other security concern of Russia is military relations between Ukraine and the US (NATO).
This creates different possibilities that are unfavorable to Russia. One of them is related to the
position of MDS in the territory of Ukraine (Nartov 2004). The other problem is loss of naval
military positions related to the Black Sea. Ukraine was potentially a member candidate country of
NATO (NATO Budapest summit 2008).   
One of the main security concerns of Russia regarding Europeanization of Ukraine is the issue
of  Russian  territorial  integrity.  Therefore,  if  Ukraine  becomes  pro-Western  it  could  create  a
precedent  for  Russian  liberal  powers.  The Russian  government  is  afraid  of  “color  revolutions”
within Russia. Also, it is concerned with the spread of separatism movements in the North Caucasus
and Chechnya (Chafuen 2014). 
8.2 South Caucasus
The  South  Caucasus  region  includes  three  independent  states:  Azerbaijan,  Armenia  and
Georgia.  All  these  countries  were  part  of  the  Russian  Empire,  then  the  USSR  and  obtained
independence in early 1990th. 
Russia used to claim itself as a security guarantor of the Caucasus region. Russian government
sees several security issues for Russian Federation within this region that come both from internal
and external threats. The main internal security issue is related to the territorial integrity of the
Russian Federation, namely to the North Caucasus. Russia is concerned about the potential spread
of  separatist  movements  and  religious  fundamentalism from the  South  Caucasus  to  the  North
Caucasus (Freni 2011). Main external threats for Russia are the following: increasing NATO ties
with Caucasian states, the possibilities of “color revolutions” and projects of oil and gas pipelines to
bypass Russia (Nichol 2014). 
Practically, Russia influences these states by weakening the governance and causing domestic
instability, that force their leaders to seek for Russian assistance. This policy creates a beneficial
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environment for Russian ambitions (Freni 2011).
The South Caucasian countries have responded differently to Russian ambitions and political
activities. The details of politics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are the following. 
Armenia developed close economic and military ties with Russia. Therefore, Russia becomes
the  main  investor  in  Armenia  (Nichol  2014).  At  the  same time,  Russian  military bases  in  this
country and military agreements are viewed by Russian officials as the only guarantee for security
of Armenia against Azerbaijan and potentially Turkey. Therefore, Armenia is the most pro-Russian
states within the South Caucasus. 
The position of Azerbaijan in international relations could be described as a balance between
Russian and Western interests. Azerbaijan avoided military presence of Russia on its territory, but
built sufficient economic relations with Moscow. From the perspective of energy geopolitics Baku
is  a  competitor  of  Moscow  in  the  European  energy  market.  Azerbaijan  develops  its  energy
geopolitics  with  BP and other  Western  energy companies.  Pipeline  projects  bypass  Russia  and
relate to the emphasis by the US of the central position of Azerbaijan in alternative energy roads
(Freni 2011). 
Azerbaijan was able to build strong economic and military ties with the US when Baku opened
its airport to supply the US forces in Afghanistan, and Azerbaijani troops were deployed there along
with NATO troops. Also Azerbaijani soldiers also were deployed to Iraq (Cohen 2014).       
At the same time Azerbaijan has huge military cooperation agreements with Russia (Nichol
2014). Baku purchase weapons, military equipment, and special technical services to upgrade its
army from Moscow. The position of Russia in this case is twofold, as a main military supplier both
for Armenia and Azerbaijan and at the same time main mediator in conflict resolution processes
between these states.   
Georgia, after “Rose Revolution” (2003), had very cold relations with Russia. Official relations
between Russian and Georgia stopped after the August war in 2008 (Nichol 2014).  
Georgia has a strategic location as a transit country that includes energy roads (alternative to
Russia). Also Georgia developed very close relations with NATO and became an aspirant country
for  membership  (NATO Budapest  summit  2008)  (Tsereteli  2008).  Russia  considered  that  as  a
security threat (Nartov 2004). Therefore, Moscow wanted to prevent the integration of Georgia into
NATO and used the oil and gas pipeline system that connects the Caspian Sea resources to world
markets to pursue its policies (Tsereteli 2008).   
Russia  provided  various  economic  sanctions  against  Georgia,  and  used  energy  prices  to
pressure it, but it did not bring the expected results (Tsereteli 2008).  Probably due to this, Russia
started the war with Georgia in 2008 and after occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Moscow
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officially recognized the independence of these territories (Nichol 2014).   
Currently,  Russia  has  a  significant  military presence in  the  South  Caucasus,  based on two
military bases in Armenia and military forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (disputed territories of
Georgia). Also Russia located about 88,000 troops to the North Caucasus, and has the naval forces
of the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea to draw on too (Nichol 2014).
From the energy point of view, the major influence tool has been the prices it charges the South
Caucasian countries for gas. For example, after 2006 Russia raised gas prices, Armenia agreed to
transfer  various  energy assets  to  Russian companies  as  payment;  Georgia negotiated  import  of
Azerbaijani gas; Azerbaijan stopped its purchase of Russian gas (Nichol 2014).  
The other influence instrument is an escalation of ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus. One
of  the  biggest  frozen  conflicts  in  this  region  is  the  Nagorno-Karabakh  conflict.  A ceasefire
agreement was signed in July 1994 but an average of about 30 troops and civilians is killed each
year on the Azerbaijan-Armenia border (Nichol 2014). Russia was actively involved in mediating
the conflict, but at the same time provided military assistance to both sides (Freni 2011). 
From perspective energy geopolitics Russia wants to have a primary position in oil and gas
production and transportation in  the Caspian Sea region.  To achieve these goals,  Russia has to
compete with other forces that have strategic and energy interest in this region. Because the Russian
government could not use attractive economic and political dividends for the Caucasian states it
uses military force to strengthen its position in the region and weaken the security of alternative
energy projects.  For example,  the occupation of  the part  of  Georgia,  which is  the main transit
country for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the TANAP gas pipeline project (Cohen 2014).
 
8.3 Central Asia
Russia view Central Asia as the key region for its national security. Russia needs to have a
stable situation and strong strategic positions within this region, in order to have an access to China
and India (Osuli 2014). 
Russian interests in this region clash with the interests of the US, the EU and China. Russian
politics evaluate the involvement of other world powers in Central Asia as an attempt to weaken the
Russian positions in its own backyard. 
Importance of Central Asia in Russian geopolitics is explained by the essential role of this
region in Russian Eurasian project and Russian ambitions to become global energy superpower.
Therefore, Russia views the creation of pipelines through the South Caucasus and Caspian Sea for
transportation of energy resources of Central Asia to the world markets as the security threat (Osuli
2014).         
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 Another security issue for Russia is democratization and liberalization of Central Asian states
as the result of Western intervention. Russian government links it with loss of influence and overall
destabilization of the region. Moscow wants to prevent democratic and liberal “color revolutions”
and radicalization of governments that could become hostile to Russian plans in the region (Osuli
2014).
One of the security issues of Russia is the security situation of the Russian population in the
region and especially in Kazakhstan. In this case the existence of huge Russian populations located
in the north of the country that could be used by Russia in its concept of russkiy mir is important to
keep in  mind.  In case Kazakhstan reveals  more clear  ambitions  to  pursue independent  policies
toward Europe or China the ‘population question’ can be used to block such attempts. 
To sum up, in Central Asia Russian policy includes: support of the Russian population, creation
of allies in the south border of Russia to protect its territory from radical Islamist movements and to
obtain better positions in this region in comparison to other world powers (Osuli 2014).   
8.4 Securitisation issues
Within the overall  framework of this  thesis  it  is  impossible  to analyze in  detail  the use of
securitisation moves of  each and every smaller state that border Russia. Therefore, securitisation of
these states should  be viewed within the overall securitisation policy of the world powers as they
struggle with (or against) Russia and Vice Versa. 
For Russia,  as it  was mentioned in Chapter  4,  pro-Russian governments within post-soviet
countries and Eastern European states are vital for its plans to become a global power. Therefore,
the securitisation issues for  Russia  within the border  states  are  intimately related to  the “color
revolutions”, and the potential establishment of pro-Western governments, leaning towards political,
military and economic alliances with NATO hereunder the location of MDS.
From the perspective of US,  as  was discussed in Chapter  5,  the same regions  (post-soviet
countries and Eastern European states) is evaluated as parts of the “cordon sanitaire”. The main
securitisation issue of this policy within the bigger picture is to prevent the creation a solid power
within Eurasia that could challenge the hegemony of the US.
From the EU position, as was mentioned in Chapter 6, the Eastern Europe (that includes Baltic
states,  Eastern  European  states  and  some  post-soviet  countries)  are  parts  of  “bigger”  Europe.
Therefore, the main securitisation issues here are development of democracy and democratization
of the society, resistance to authoritarian governments and systems, and economic development.
The Chinese securitisation issues within Russian border states, as it was discussed in previous
chapters, close to Russian geopolitical goals. In this case, the Central Asian region is in the focus.
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Therefore, the main securitisation issues are related to preserving existing governments, creation of
political stability in the region(s), development of dense economic and infrastructure links, and,
most importantly, the prevention of political and military intervention of Western countries, mainly
the US, in this region.        
8.5 Summary
Currently Russia is focused on strengthening its positions within the post-soviet region, where
Russian  geopolitics  traditionally had a  privileged position.  Russia  cannot  provide “soft  power”
instruments to attract newly independent states. So, the diplomacy of Russia in these states is based
on energy policy and military power. 
Therefore, we can observe the militarization of Russian energy geopolitics in the former USSR
territories. The cases of Georgia and Ukraine reveal that first Russia tries to increase its influence
via energy exports, giving bonuses if state policies favor Russia, and punish them through energy
prices if they do not. But, when the interstate processes get out of control and energy geopolitics
lose its power, Russia uses military means to restore its influence. 
As part of current trends in international politics where Russia has basically become an outcast,
the proclaimed idea of russkiy mir and the aggressive resistance of Western influence in post-soviet
countries could ignite future conflicts. The most obvious ones are the frozen Nagorno-Karabach
conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Azerbaijan is in the middle of developing existing and
future alternative energy supply routes for the EU. Armenia is under the strong political and military
influence of Russia. This issue could treat future energy roads that bypass Russia.
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Chapter 9. Conclusion
The concluding result of this thesis can be summarized in the findings that briefly answer the
Working  questions  related  to  Russian  geopolitical  concept  and  its  relations  to  other  actors  of
international relations:
 The Russian energy geopolitics is part of the bigger geopolitical strategy of Russia that is
based on the vision of the multi-polar world and ambitions of the hegemony state.
 US-Russian geopolitical relations from the US perspective are seen as relations between the
world power and a semi-regional power, because objectively the USSR lost in the Cold War.
From the Russian perspective, this relationship is unfair as Russia sees itself as a world
power, the successor of the USSR.
 EU-Russian geopolitical relations are based on energy relations. From the EU perspective
the military ambitions of Russia are dangerous for the stability of Europe.  From the Russian
point of view Eastern Europe has been within the traditional domain of Russian influence
from the Russian Empire period.
 Chinese-Russian  geopolitical  relations  are  based  on  their  past  communist  ideology,  but
currently China has more links to the US than to Russia. At the same time, Russia is seen in
China as a huge source of natural resources that could support the economy of China. The
Russian perspective is  not straightforward.  From the economic perspective Sino-Russian
relations could bring Russia capital and technologies, and from the political perspective the
far east of Russia could be softly occupied by China that is demographically much stronger
state.
 Relations between Russia and its border states are based on a Russian vision of itself as a
successor of the USSR and the Russian Empire. Therefore, the current Russian government
expects natural dominance in the post-soviet region and Eastern Europe. In reality, most of
the states in this region try to follow their own development path and become independent
from Russian influence. At the same time, Russia concerns Western intervene in post-soviet
region as a direct threat to its national interests and uses available leverage means to prevent
it. In extreme cases even military intervention.     
On the basis of answers to Working question that general research question of this thesis could
be addressed as following:
 Currently in international relations Russia focuses on stabilization of the situation around
Ukraine. This includes acceptance by the world community the Russian annexation of the
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Crimea and the federalization of the Eastern part of Ukraine. Another goal is to mitigate the
effect of economic sanctions that were adopted against Russia by the US and the EU. In
energy geopolitics Russia pursues the goal to dominate in the lucrative European market. At
the same time Russia creates projects to consolidate energy powers of the Caspian region
and Central Asia. This is linked to the future ambitions to play a significant role as a global
energy superpower and export oil and gas in the perspective Chinese market and develop the
Siberian part of the country. 
 In domestic politics, Russian government tries to preserve political powers and keep the
authoritarian regime as long as possible. The main issues in this case are “color revolutions”
and separatist movements within Russian. Therefore, the liberal political forces in Russia are
stigmatized and repressed.      
Analytical framework of this thesis that was based on application of securitisation theory to
various global actors gave me unique academic experience. One of the main discoveries that I have
made for  myself  is  related to  the main concept  of  securitisation theory,  namely the process of
speech act. Publications of different academics, speeches of politicians, mass media sources and
other mediums of social interaction is rich source to evaluate practical application of speech act
principles. Despite the huge differences between states that were covered in this thesis the general
model of securitisation of issues that based on political reasons rather that real problems, is the
same in all of evaluated countries.   
After finishing this thesis and summarizing its results I must admit that this thesis could be
done slightly differently. Particularly, in chapters related to the US, the EU and China I would use
more original sources rather that secondary ones. In chapter related to Russian geopolitics I would
give  more  detailed  description  of  Russian  geopolitical  concepts,  their  roots  and  historical
development. In chapter related to smaller states I would add states that border Russia in Far East,
namely Mongolia, North Korea and South Korea.  
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